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PRICE DIFFERENTIALS AND PRODUCT
DIFFERENTIATION: THE ISSUES UNDER THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
FREDERICK M. ROWEt
"THE CONSUMER IS MADE THE GoAT"
--Minority Report by Rep. Emmanuel
Celler on the Patman Bill, H.R. 8442,
H.R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess. pt. 2, at 6 (1936).
THE modern firm's differentiation of its products is part of the strategy of
diversification that has guided business growth for exploiting the post-war
mass market.' With the prodigious output of a booming technology pouring
into an economy of abundance,2 business cannot rest content to satisfy the
public's basic wants. Creative "merchandising" must move and diffuse the
stream among consumers, while advertising renews cravings for goods to
provide the substance, or the illusion, of the better life.3 In competing for
greater shares of this market, alert enterprisers cultivate more than customer
tMember of District of Columbia and New York Bars. This article will be integrated
into a text on the Robinson-Patman Act to be published by Little, Brown & Co.
1. Such growth has occurred by expansion from within, -e.g., Burck, The Rush to
Diversify, Fortune, Sept. 1955, p. 91; Staudt, Program For Product Diversification, Harv.
Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec. 1954, p. 121, as well as through the acquisition of existing enterprises.
Indeed, the "conglomerate merger" or corporate "mixed marriage" is the most dramatic
feature of the current merger movement. See FTC, REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGmS AND
AcQuisiroNs c. V (1955); FOULKE, DIVERSIFICATION IN BUSINESS AcnvWr 28-34
(1956); Harris, The Urge to Merge, Fortune, Nov. 1.954, p. 102; Kaplan, The Current
Merger Movement Analyzed, Harv. Bus. Rev., May-June 1955, pp. 91, 95-99; Smith, The
Olin-Mathieson Deal, Fortune, Nov. 1954, p. 107; Chaffetz, The "Flood Tide of Mergers"
and the Public Interest 5-6 (Mimeo. Dec. 28, 1954).
2. The economy in 1956 was barreling along at a record gross national product rate top-
ping $400 billion. Consumer expenditures alone had reached a rate of $274 billion annually
in 1955. EcoNomsIc REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 1-4 (1956) ; Fortune, Sept. 1956, p. 37. See
also ALLEN, THE BIG CHANGE (1952); EDITORS OF FORTUNE, THE CHANGING AmERICAN
MARKET (1955) ; Burck & Parker, What A Country!, Fortune, Oct. 1956, p. 127.
3. See Seligman, The Amazing Advertising Business, Fortune, Sept. 1956, p. 107;
Barnet, Showdown in the Market Place, Harv. Bus. Rev., July-Aug. 1956, p. 85; Silber-
man, Retailing: It's a New Ball Game, Fortune, Aug. 1955, p. 78; cf. SPECTORSKY, THE
ExUnANITES (1955); WAKEMAN, THE HucKSTmas (1946); Brown, Advertising and the
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affection for a single standard item. Brands, models, and styles abound.
For differentiation can maximize profits by diversifying the firm's range of
analogous products-similar yet distinct enough to capture every nuance of the
consumer's need, mood, or wealth.
4
The result is a multitude of variations on a basic product theme promoted by
each firm and clamoring for customer recognition-at a variety of prices.
But a business policy of distributing differentiated goods at differential
prices must contend with the Robinson-Patman Act's legal pull toward price
uniformity by sellers. 5 As passed in 1936 to amend the original Clayton Act,
Robinson-Patman was a political weapon fashioned by "small business"
groups to stem the inroads of modern mass marketing methods that threatened
to revolutionize distribution and short-circuit traditional brokers, wholesalers,
and retailers. 6 Drafted, masterminded, and piloted through Congress by the
organized grocers in the wake of NRA, the Patman bill mobilized the Poujadist
Pusblic Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165 (1948). In 1955
total advertising expenditures zoomed to an all-time high of nearly $10 billion. Printer's
Ink, Feb. 10, 1956, p. 23; Seligman, supra at 107.
4. Klaw, Whiner and Still Champion: P. & G., Fortune, March 1956, pp. 104, 105;
Whyte, The Cadillac Phenomenon, Fortune, Aug. 1955, p. 106; Lippincott & Margulies,
Packaging in Top-Level Planning, Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept.-Oct. 1956, p. 46; The 9300,000,-
000 Question: How Many Grades of Gasoline?, National Petroleum News, June 1956,
p. 92.
5. For a general survey of the origin and legal impact of the Robinson-Patman Act,
49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1952), see Rowe, Price Discrinination, Com petition,
and Confusion: Another Look at Robinson-Patinan, 60 YALE L.J. 929 (1951). See also
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COIMrITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAws 155-221 (1955) (hereinafter cited as ATr'Y GEN. REP.) ; Kintner, The Revitalized
Federal Trade Cotmiission-A Two-Year Evaluation, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1143, 1155-73
(1955); VAN CISE, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS 23-29, 83-86 (1955); Syn-
posium on the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 196-294 (1954); DIRLAM &
KAHN, FAIR COMPETITION: THE LAW AND EcoNomics or ANTITRUST PoLIcY 119-34, 202-
56 (1954) ; Austern, Tabula in Naufragio-Adininistrative Style, Some Observations on
the Robinson-Patman Act, 1953 CCH ANTITRUST LAW SYMaPosIuM 105 (1953) ; AUSTIN,
PRICE DISCRIIINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
(rev. ed. 1953); Sunderland, The Robinson-Patman Act: Go Out and Compete But
Don't Get Caught At It, 34 CHI. BAR REc. 447 (1953) ; Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust
Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MIcH. L. Rav. 1139,
1198-1213 (1952).
6. This political origin of the Robinson-Patman Act has passed beyond controversy
into the annals of history. See, e.g., Burns, The Effectiveness of the Antitrust Laws: A
Symposium, 39 AMi. EcoN. REv. 689, 695 (1949) ("The Robinson-Patman Act... is a part
of the struggle between the older and newer organizations in distribution in which the older
group sought protection from the state presumably because it was not prepared to rely oil
the outcome of competition."). To like effect, consult PALAMOUNTAIN, THE POLITICS
OF DisTRIBuTioN c. VII (1955) ; Fulda, Food Distribution in the United States, The
Struggle Between Independents and Chains, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 1051, 1082-1109 (1951) ;
Note, 58 YALE L.J. 969, 970 (1949) ; Edwards, The Struggle for Control of Distributin,
1 J. MARKETING 212 (1937) ; McNair, Marketing Functions and Costs and the Robinson-
Patian Act, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 334 (1937) ; McAllister, Price Control by Law
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prejudices festering in an era of crisis.7 To overcome problems of constitution-
ality posed by "special legislation" addressed to the food industry alone, the
framers jerrybuilt a prolix enactment that went beyond the "anti-chain store"
objectives of its backers to impose pervasive legal restrictions on pricing and
promotion in all sectors of the economy.8 The act's principal enforcement
in the United States, id. at 273, 289-96; Burns, The Antitrust Laws and the Regulation
of Price Competition, id. at 301; Learned & Isaacs, The Robinson-Patinan Law: Some
Assumptions and Expectations, 15 HARV. Bus. REV. 137 (1937).
In the contemporary opinion of Rep. Celler, a vigorous opponent of the Patman legis-
lation:
"The advocates of this bill include many independents unable to meet competition
which is easily met by their efficient fellow dealers, and as well wholesale grocers
catering to such small dealers handling the basic necessity, food, and asking for un-
natural restraints upon their most efficient competition. They searched high and low
when they had the N.R.A. for ways and means to the same selfish end. They want
no restraints on themselves; they want them only applied to the other fellow.
...Unfortunately, housewives and the consumer generally are not organized.
Their voice is not articulate. But retail grocers and the retail druggists, and the
wholesalers catering to them, have banded together and have raised a lot of com-
motion and issued forth reams and reams of propaganda in support of this bill, but
no thought have they given to the consumer."
H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 6 (1936). Two decades later history
repeated itself. See note 142 infra.
7. For details, see PALAMOUNTAI,, THE POLITICS OF DIsTmIBuToN c. VII (1955) and
note 28 infra. The legislation was passed amid congressional demagoguery verging on
hysteria. See, e.g., "Mr. SHANNON. Yes; let us strike. Remember you are striking for
your child and your grandchild, that he may have the opportunity that you and I had before
the damnable chains came into existence in this country. [Applause.]" 80 CONG. REc. 8129
(1936). Mr. Patman asserted that "there is a conspiracy existing between a few Wall
Street bankers and some of the heads of the biggest business institutions in this Nation to
absolutely get control of retail distribution. They expect to do that through the chain-store
system." 79 CONG. REc. 11575 (1935). And he insisted that his bill had "the opposition of
all cheaters, chiselers, bribe takers, bribe givers, and the greedy who seek monopolistic
powers." 80 CONG. REc. 3447 (1936). The few hardy opponents led by Rep. Celler became
the target of abuse carrying ugly overtones of bigotry. See, e.g., Remarks of Reps. Patman
and Cox, id. at 8111-12, 8118. Mr. Patman agreed that 90% of the people affected by his
bill lived in two congressional districts in "the heart of New York where holders of privi-
lege reside," "profiting to the extent of millions of dollars a year through their chiseling,
cheating, racketeering tactics." Id. at 7887, 8112. See also debates, id. at 8232, 9415-16. Mr.
Celler vainly protested that the Gentleman from Texas was "enthusiastically misguided,"
and that "the consumer will pay the piper." Id. at 8116, 8118.
Compare this congressional oratory and the statement of Rep. Patman in 1937, "Chain
stores are out. There is no place for chain stores in the American economic picture," with
the declaration of Huey Long: "I would rather have thieves and gangsters than chain
stores in Louisiana." Quotations from McNair, supra note 6, at 334 n.1; Fulda, supra note
6, at 1051. As recently reminisced by Rep. Patman, "one certain big concern had really
caused the passage of this Act, the A&P Tea Company." Hearings Before the Antitrust
Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee on Bills to Amend Sections 2 and 3 of
the Clayton Act, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1956).
8. See 80 CONG. REc. 6429 (1936).
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mechanisms are administrative proceedings before the Federal Trade Com-
mission and treble damage suits by "injured" persons. 9
This article spotlights those Robinson-Patman doctrines governing the dis-
tribution of differentiated products, appraises their impact on marketing, and
proposes reforms.
EVOLUTION OF LEGAL DOCTRINE
Since "precision of expression is not an outstanding characteristic of the
Robinson-Patman Act,"'10 a program of product differentiation must cope with
several interlacing provisions." The legality of a pricing or promotion strategy
depends initially on whether the products are "of like grade and quality" with-
in the meaning of the act. Price differentials quoted for such goods are illegal
whenever they constitute "discriminations" whose effect "may be substantially
to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or
to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants
or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination. . . ." However, a
prima facie unlawful differential may be excused if demonstrably reflecting
only "due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or de-
livery," or "made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor."
On the other hand, promotional payments or "services" are conclusively illegal
if not extended to all competing buyers on "proportionally equal terms."
Current doctrines applicable to differentiated goods trace from the original
Clayton Act, the objectives of the 1936 Robinson-Patman amendments, and
rulings by the Federal Trade Commission and the courts.
Pre-1936 Clayton Act Provisions
The law of today originated in the Clayton Act passed in 1914.12 Aimed at
a predatory tactic of national "trusts" to slash prices in certain localities for
9. Although the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission theoreti-
cally share jurisdiction, 38 STAT. 734, 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 21, 25 (1952), the Justice
Department in practice has left civil Robinson-Patman enforcement to the FTC almost
entirely. A separate criminal provision vaguely duplicating and overlapping the main civil
provisions has been invoked only sporadically by the Justice Department, but has received
a recent upsurge of attention from private damage claimants. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.
S.C. § 13a (1952). E.g., Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954). See
ATT'y GEN. REP. 198-201. On private enforcement, see Comment, Antitrust Enforcement by
Private Parties: Analysis of Developments in the Treble Damage Sidt, 61 YALE L.J. 1010
(1952); Doyle, Treble Damages and Counsel Fees, ABA SEcToIN OF ANTITRUST LAw
PROCEEDINGS 142 (Aug. 1954) ; Clark, The Treble Damage Bonanca, 52 MIcH. L. REV.
363 (1954).
10. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 65 (1953). Robinson-Patman has
also been dubbed a law that is "vague and general in its wording and which cannot be
translated with assurance into any detailed set of guiding yardsticks." Ruberoid Co. v.
FTC, 189 F.2d 893, 894-95 (2d Cir. 1951).
11. For the text of the pertinent provisions, see notes 24 and 103 infra and accompany-
ing analysis.
12. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1952).
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the purpose of eliminating a smaller rival, section 2 of the act prohibited price
"discriminations" threatening "to substantially lessen competition or tend
toward monopoly in any line of commerce"-unless they were made "on
account of differences in the grade, quality, or quantity of the commodity
sold"; corresponded with "differences in the cost of selling or transportation";
or were quoted "in good faith to meet competition."' 3
Two decisions in the 1930's delineated the areas of future conflict: price
differentials among similar products of varying physical attributes, and among
branded and unbranded versions of one basic commodity.
The physical factors in "grade" and "quality" were stressed in Boss Manu-
factzring Co. v. Payne Glove Co.14 A charge of predatory price cutting was
dismissed because the "special" gloves sold at destructively low prices were
manufactured from inferior materials by less experienced labor than the higher-
priced regular product. Hence the alleged discrimination was refuted by
"physical facts as to the difference in material and construction" between the
products marketed at differential prices.' 5
The FTC's landmark Goodyear Tire & Rubber decision in 1936 con-
demned price differentials among first-line tires sold under differing brands. 16
A cost-plus manufacturing arrangement created price differentials between
Goodyear's tires sold to Sears, Roebuck for resale under the Sears "All State"
13. Section 2 was intended to strike at a
"common practice of great and powerful combinations engaged in commerce-no-
tably the Standard Oil Co., and the American Tobacco Co., and others of less notorie-
ty, but of great influence-to lower prices of their commodities, oftentimes below the
cost of production in certain communities and sections where they had competition,
with the intent to destroy and make unprofitable the business of their competitors,
and with the ultimate purpose in view of thereby acquiring a monopoly in the par-
ticular locality or section in which the discriminating price is made."
H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1914). See Mennen Co. v. FTC, 288 Fed. 774,
778-79 (2d Cir. 1923). The enforcement of old § 2 is surveyed in MILLER, UNFAIR CoM-
PETITION 13041 (1941); HEDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE ComissioN c. V (1925);
IcAllister, Sales Policies and Price Discrimination under the Clayton Act, 41 YALE L.J.
518 (1932).
Conceivably the exemption of "grade" or "quality" differentials was planted to weaken
§ 2's effectiveness at a critical point, for a lethal variant of the destructive price warfare
practiced by "trusts" was the establishment of "bogus independents" and other false fronts
that sold an inferior or "fighting brand" at cut-throat prices in the territory of a local
competitor marked for extinction. E.g., United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 226 Fed. 62,
74 (W.D.N.Y. 1915); United States v. Corn Products Refining Co., 234 Fed. 964, 992
(S.D.N.Y. 1916). See STEVENS, UNFAIR COMPETITION 10 (1917). As Sen. Cummins re-
marked of these qualifications hedging the prohibited conduct, "there are not enough teeth
in section 2 of the Clayton bill to masticate successfully milk toast." 51 CONG. REc. 14250
(1914). See also id. at 14228.
14. 71 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1934).
15. Id. at 770.
16. 22 F.T.C. 232 (1936). The case is analyzed in MILLER, UNFAIR COMPETITION 128-
29, 136-39 (1914).
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brand and the Goodyear "All Weather" brand tire marketed through the
Goodyear distributor organization. Goodyear unsuccessfully sought to justify
its differential as "made on account of quantity. '17 In addition, the legally
.provable cost economies accruing to Goodyear from dealing with Sears, a mass
buyer, accounted for only part of the differential and left a sizeable "net" dis-
crimination in Sears' favor.' 8 And Goodyear's concession that all the tires,
irrespective of brand and trademarks, were "comparable in quality" permitted
the Commission to find that the price differential "was not made on account of
differences in the grade or quality of the tires sold to Sears, Roebuck & Com-
pany.'
19
The core of illegality exposed by the Commission's inquiry into the com-
petitive effects of the arrangement was the inflation of the private-brand mass
buyer's gross operating margin in comparison with the regular Goodyear
branded tire distributor's. Admittedly, the tire distributed by Sears, Roebuck
under its own "All State" brand was at a distinct disadvantage in rivalry with
the heavily advertised and promoted Goodyear brand for sales to the con-
sumer.20 However, the FTC concluded that Goodyear's price differential in
favor of Sears not only neutralized that handicap, but conferred a substantial
advantage besides.21 Accordingly, the Commission found the forbidden detri-
ment to competition because "Sears, Roebuck & Co. has a much larger gross
margin for profit upon which to operate in the sale of tires than the ordinary
Goodyear service station dealers and sub-dealers enjoy, and this price dis-
crimination has been and is a direct and substantial causative factor in the
competitive situation in the retail tire indtastry" which saw a rapid growth of
Sears and a decline of competing tire dealers.
22
17. The Commission considered this requirement met only so long as the size of the
quantity discount was related to cost savings by the seller in dealing with the quantity
buyer. 22 F.T.C. at 329. The court of appeals' ultimate reversal of the Commission repudi-
ated this view of the law, and held that § 2's exemptions for price differentials based on
grade, quality or quantity and also for differentials reflecting cost differences were in-
dependent and self-sufficient. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 101 F.2d 620, 623-24
(6th Cir. 1939). See note 23 infra.
18. 22 F.T.C. at 283, 326. This conclusion is dubious because it declined to recognize
a host of "intangible" economies enjoyed by Goodyear as a result of the arrangement
whereby Sears assumed the risks of raw material price fluctuations and credit losses, be-
sides foregoing the returns from alternative investment of its capital. See id. at 287; 101
F.2d at 622.
19. 22 F.T.C. at 290.
20. Some of this consumer preference stemmed from Goodyear's sales of its branded
tire to manufacturers as original equipment for automobiles, thereby predisposing the car
owner to purchase the same brand for his replacement needs. In addition, Goodyear had
spent about $4Y2 million annually to promote its branded product with the public. Id. at
311. This margin of consumer preference for the Goodyear branded tire-and correspond-
ing handicap for the Sears product-was approximately 20 to 25% of the retail price during
the relevant years. Id. at 308.
21. The price differential gave Sears a gross quotation 30 to 40% more favorable than
the price paid by rival tire distributors. Id. at 279.
22. Id. at 313. Compare note 18 supra.
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The Boss and Goodyear decisions thus pinpointed these critical factors
pertinent to product differentiation: the scope of the "grade" and "quality"
concept; the incidence of detriment to competition; and the potentialities of
cost justification.
Robinson-Patman Legislative History
The overmastering desire of the Robinson-Patman draftsmen in 1936 to
abolish any blanket immunity for quantity discounts 2 led to a wholesale
statutory reorganization. Several revisions affected the pricing and promotion
of differentiated products: The tests of detriment to competition were tightened
so as to nip discriminations creating "injury" short of competitive debilita-
tion in an entire "line of commerce. '24 Specific restrictions on promotional
23. Although the court of appeals' Goodyear reversal authorizing unlimited quantity
discounts did not come until 1939, that statutory interpretation was anticipated in the 1935
hearings on the Robinson-Patman proposals. E.g., Hearings Before the House Judiciary
Committee on Bills to Amend the Clayton Act, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 214, 248, 257-58
(1935).
The amendments achieved the FTC's goal in the Goodyear case to ensure that the
amount of a seller's cost savings in dealing with large customers set the ceiling on per-
missible discounts in their favor. This was accomplished by deletion of the former ex-
press exemption of differentials made "on account of quantity," so as to leave quantity
discounts as all other price differentials to be legally justified by recourse to the defense
of cost justification which could take account of economies arising from quantity sales. In
essence, quantity discounts were made subject to the statutory provisions in the same way
as any other form of price differentiation. For the applicable text, see note 24 infra.
As a special limitation on quantity discounts, however, the Robinson-Patman amend-
ments added a proviso authorizing the Federal Trade Commission to impose a ceiling on
even cost-justified quantity differentials whenever it found "that available purchasers in
greater quantities are so few as to render differentials on account thereof unjustly dis-
criminatory or promotive of monopoly in any line of commerce .... 49 STAT. 1526 (1936),
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1952). To date this power has been invoked but once-by the Com-
mission's issuance in 1951 of a quantity limit of 20,000 pounds for automotive tires and
tubes. A district court has recently granted summary judgment nullifying this quantity
limit in a suit brought by numerous affected tire manufacturers and buyers who assailed
the Commission's rule on procedural and substantive grounds. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. FTC,
134 F. Supp. 39 (D.D.C. 1955). Both the statutory proviso and its implementation by the
Commission have been flayed as incompatible with overall antitrust policy as curbing price
reductions directly related to operating efficiencies. ATrr'Y GEN. REP. 176-77; DIRLA- &
KAHN, FAIR COmPETIrioN: THE LAW AND EcoNomIlcs OF AnTITRUST PoLICY 243-45
(1954) ; McGee, The Decline and Fall of Quantity Discounts: The Quantity Limit Rule
in Rubber Tires and Tubes, 27 J. Bus. U. CHI. 225 (1954) ; Adelman, The Consistency
of the Robinson-Patma n Act, 6 STAN. L. REv. 3, 7 (1953).
24. As amended, sections 2(a) and (b) made it unlawful for any person "in the course
of" commerce
"to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade
and quality, . . . where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to in-
jure, destroy or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly
receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them:
19561
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payments or services were added.2 5 The provision for price differentials re-
flecting differences in "grade" or "quality" moved up from its former spot
in a defensive proviso into the definitional text of the act, whose controls now
became operative only after the "like grade and quality" of the products in
question was established.26 Whereas under old Clayton 2 a seller might de-
fend by relating his differential pricing to variations in the "grade" or "quality"
of his differentiated products, the Robinson-Patman Act did not apply until the
plaintiff proved the products' "like grade and quality."
27
During the legislative hearings and debates preceding enactment, only the
"like grade and quality" provision received attention focused on the marketing
of differentiated goods. Addition of the word "brand" to the requirement of
"like grade and quality" was fruitlessly urged to protect the distribution of
privately branded products. Mr. Teegarden, counsel for the United States
Wholesale Grocers' Association and draftsman of the Patman bill, denounced
the proposal as "a specious suggestion that would destroy entirely the efficacy
of the bill against larger buyers" who would negotiate for a special brand on
top of a price concession from the seller.2 8 Also, an amendment confining the
Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only
due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting
from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such pur-
chasers sold or delivered....
". ... Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller
rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing that his lower price or the
furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good
faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities fur-
nished by a competitor."
49 STAT. 1,526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13 (a), (b) (1952).
25. For text and discussion of these provisions, see note 103 infra and acconipanying
text.
26. See text of § 2 (a) quoted in note 24 supra.
27. The "meeting competition" defense has had no impact on the validity of price
differentials for differentiated products, and has in any event been crippled by restrictive
FTC interpretations. The rise and fall of the defense is portrayed in the annals of the
classic Standard Oil litigation, now in its seventeenth year of strife and pending before the
Supreme Court for the second time. In its original Standard Oil ruling in 1945, the Com-
mission held the "meeting competition" defense unavailable whenever it entered a finding
of competitive "injury." 41 F.T.C. 263 (1945). This statutory interpretation was over-
turned in 1951 by the Supreme Court which construed § 2(b) as authorizing an "absolute"
defense irrespective of FTC findings as to "injury." Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S.
231 (1951). Upon remand, however, the Commission in 1953 again rejected Standard's
defense-for lack of "good faith" owing partly to such "injury." 49 F.T.C. 923, 953-55
(1953). The court of appeals now has reversed this latest FTC action as incompatible with
the facts and the Supreme Court's decision, 233 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1956), and the Com-
mission has petitioned for certiorari. 25 U.S.L. WExx 3107 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1956) (No. 465).
For the legislative tribulations of the meeting competition defense, see note 142 infra.
28. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee on Bills to
Amend the Clayton Act, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 421, 469 (1.936).
Rep. Patman testified that "Mr. Teegarden wrote this bill." Hearings Before the House
Judiciary Committee on Bills to Amend the Clayton Act, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1935) ;
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act to commodities of like "design," as well as "like grade and quality," was
formally rejected after being scored for facilitating evasion by subterfuge in
labeling and packaging.
2 9
From the legislative evolution of the Robinson-Patman amendments, this
much was clear: rejection of proposals to establish "likeness" in brand or
design as an additional statutory prerequisite signified that no blanket exemp-
tion was contemplated for "like" products differentiated only in brand or design.
Beyond this the act's application to differentiated goods was left for refinement
by adjudication."
Infornial FTC Rulings
The first price discrimination proceedings informally terminated by the
Federal Trade Commission between 1936 and 1937 included several dismissals
due to product variations that negatived the requisite "like grade and quality." 3'
All proceedings charged discriminatory pricing by handbag and millinery manu-
facturers said to favor their large chain and department store accounts. One
dismissal ruled that a lot of lower-priced handbags was not "of the same grade
and quality" as the more expensive merchandise since it contained "bags of
various grades and qualities, particularly with respect to market values" ;32 an-
other determined that the lower-priced bags were "not like" other bags because
they bore the "chain store's private brand or trademark" and were "specially
designed to match the shoes which it sells" ;33 and a third deemed the lower-
priced millinery of different "grade" comprising "slow-moving styles, small
sizes, less-expensive trimmings, and dyes which are less expensive to apply."
34
ef. id. at 27-28, 195. Actually, the United States Wholesale Grocers' Association, whose
members felt the grocery chains' competitive pinch, was the dynamo behind the Robinson-
Patman Act, in alliance with associations of retail druggists, retail grocers, and food
brokers who have provided the organized political bulwarks of the act ever since. See notes
6 supra, 142 infra. Mr. Teegarden, the wholesalers' astute and ubiquitous counsel, func-
tioned as Mr. Patman's factotum, drafting, analyzing, explaining, and steering throughout
the forensic preliminaries until enactment. See Hearings, supra at 14-29, 30-39, 200-36,
244-69, 446-70.
29. 80 CONG. R~c. 8234-35 (1936). During floor debate, Rep. Patman also remarked
that sellers could not lawfully sell a privately branded commodity cheaper than their
regular product if they were of the same "quality." Id. at 8115.
30. The complexities latent in the "grade and quality" concept were early discerned
by Rep. Celler's Minority Statement. H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 11
(1936). He observed that there were over 100 "grades" of cotton alone, and the Sears-
Roebuck catalogue of 48,000 items might be multiplied a hundredfold to comprise all con-
ceivably cognizable "grade" variations.
31. At the request of Rep. Patman, the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission
compiled a summary of issues and disposition in early Robinson-Patman cases. 81. CONG.
REc. APP. 2336-4L (1937).
32. Id. at 2337.
33. Id. at 2339.
34. Ibid.
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These bellwether rulings not only stressed "like grade and quality" as a
statutory safeguard for differentiated products, but implied that variations of
size, style, design, and even brand might give rise to cognizable distinctions in
"grade" or "quality."
Formal Robinson-Patinan Adjudications
Subsequent formal decisions brought other pertinent provisions into play
against a seller's policies in marketing promotionally or physically differenti-
ated products.
Promotional Differentiation. The Federal Trade Commission in the Hansen
Inoculator case in 1938 ruled that inconsequential labeling variations could not
controvert "like grade and quality."3 5 Condemning price differentials in the
sale of physically identical plant pharmaceuticals varying only in the inscription
of the labels on the container, the Commission entered perfunctory uncontested
findings reciting the existence of discriminatory prices which had the requisite
"injurious" effects on competition among customers.30
Again without challenge, the Commission in the two United States Rubber
proceedings in 1939 and 1950 decided that nationally advertised and unbranded
product versions were goods of "like grade and quality." After rejecting an
attempted cost justification, the FTC in 1939 banned United States Rubber's
price differential between nationally promoted U. S. Royal tires marketed
through the United States Rubber distributor organization and the tires sold
to oil companies for distribution under their own private brands-which were
deemed of "like grade and quality. '3 7 A decade later the FTC condemned com-
parable price differentials for footwear "of like grade and quality." In this in-
stance United States Rubber had priced its nationally advertised shoes (e.g.,
"U. S.," "Keds," "Kedettes") higher than its unadvertised brands (e.g.,
"American," "Titan") as well as its shoes carrying a customer's private brand
designation.38
35. 26F.T.C.303,309 (1938).
36. Actually the labels were found to "resemble each other having green borders and
background of leguminous plants and similar language," and differed only in bearing either
the manufacturer's or the private brand customer's name. Id. at 308-09.
37. 28 F.T.C. 1489, 1500 (1939). The FTC staff in the course of the proceedings per-
mitted United States Rubber to allocate solely to its U.S. brand customers all expenditures
for U.S. Royal tire advertising and promotion. See AUSTIN, PRIcE DISCRIMINATION AND
RzArE PROBLEMS UNDER ROBINSONI-PATMAN AcT 39 n.69 (rev. ed. 1953). Although the
Commission's findings concluded that respondent's price differentials were not "cost-justi-
fied," 28 F.T.C. at 1502, United States Rubber had evidently succeeded in "cost-justify-
ing" 95% of the price spread. See testimony of William T. Kelley, FTC General Counsel,
in Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 1122, 78th
Cong., 2d Sess. 172 (1944). Inability to justify even 5% of a price differential was deemed
total failure of "cost justification."
38. 46 F.T.C. 998, 1006-09 (1950). For corroboration the FTC findings quoted United
States Rubber's own discount schedule which indiscriminately characterized its several
brands as "First" (or "Second") "grade and quality" footwear.
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While in the second United States Rubber case the Commission dismissed a
partial cost "justification" as legally inadequate, 39 such justification did subse-
quently vindicate private brand differentials. In B.F. Goodrich the FTC's com-
plaint challenged the lower prices to private brand buyers and the purchasers of
Goodrich's unadvertised "Shawmut" shoes in comparison with the higher price
for nationally advertised "Hood" and "B.F. Goodrich" footwear. But the re-
spondent persuaded FTC accountants to undertake "a more thorough exami-
nation" of its records, resulting in a concession that virtually all of the ques-
tioned price differentials were "cost-justified." And since the minor "unjusti-
fied" differentials applied only to a minute fraction of total Goodrich footwear
sales, the Commission dismissed the complaint in 1954 for lack of "public in-
terest" in further prosecution. 40 In the wake of B.F. Goodrich, the Commis-
sion's staff also agreed to an ultimate dismissal of the charges attacking Syl-
vania's quotation of higher prices for Sylvania brand tubes to its distributors
than it quoted to Philco for comparable tubes resold under the Philco brand.
41
The unopposed validation of the Sylvania cost justification in the Commis-
sion's final ruling obviated review of the "like grade and quality" and com-
petitive "injury" aspects of the Initial Decision. Though manufactured to
Philco specifications and checked and tested by Philco engineers, evidently no
physical difference existed between the Sylvania and Philco brand tubes. Ac-
cordingly, the Initial Decision held them physically "interchangeable" and
hence "of like grade and quality. '4 2 Also, Philco's price advantage over Syl-
vania distributors was blamed for competitive "injury" due to Philco's "ability"
to undersell Sylvania distributors who competed with Philco's sales subsidiary
and Philco distributors for ultimate sales to retail radio parts and service estab-
lishments.
43
In the 1954 Edelnann Initial Decision, however, lack of competitive "in-
jury" accounted for the exoneration of a private brand differential among
products of "like grade and quality. '44 Here automotive testing instruments
39. According to the findings, the cost study had "justified" a substantial fraction of
the various challenged price spreads, and in some instances had "justified" all but infinitesi-
mal amounts. While the Commission observed that such "unjustified" remainders as $.0064,
.0047, and .0092 per dollar of gross sales might be deemed de ininimis if standing alone, a
finding of violation was warranted in view of the other instances of price differentials only
fractionally "cost-justified." Id. at 1012.
40. B.F. Goodrich Co., FTC Dkt. 5677 (Dec. 10, 1953), Initial Decision adopted by
FTC (Jan. 22,1954).
41. Sylvania Elec. Products, Inc., FTC Dkt. 5728 (Sept. 23, 1954). Staff counsel
acknowledged that Sylvania had "cost-justified" the bulk of the numerous challenged price
differentials, and that the "unjustified" prices related to a limited number of tube types not
sold in any substantial volume. Paradoxically, the respondent's accounting studies had suc-
ceeded in "over-justifying" the price spreads in the sale of many tube types but had "under-
justified" others.
42. Sylvania Elec. Products, Inc., FTC Dkt. 5728, at 3 (Dec. 8, 1953).
43. Id. at 7.
44. E. Edelmann & Co., FTC Dkt. 5770 (March 5, 1954).
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were sold to oil and tire company "special brand accounts" at up to one-third
below the price regular equipment distributors paid. But, according to the
Initial Decision, the equipment differed only as to "the brand name or mark,
stamped or lithographed, on the product, and the printed insert in the hydro-
meter, showing how much of a particular antifreeze, as opposed to a number
of antifreezes, was in the radiator solution and how much was needed to pre-
vent solidification." The products were held of "like grade and quality" because
"interchangeable" and displaying "no basic functional difference."4 5 However,
the private brand accounts resold only to their own franchised dealers and
never bid for the customers of the distributors who paid the higher price; con-
versely, these franchised dealers apparently would not buy equipment from in-
dependent distributors regardless of price. With competition between the
"favored" private brand and the "disfavored" regular purchasers thus non-
existent, no competitive "injury" was traceable to the price differentials at
bar.46
Physical Differentiation. The sole judicial ruling on price differentials
among differentiated products remains the Brtce's Juices v. American Can Co.
decision in 1949.4' The district court invalidated American Can Company's
pricing of ISCANS, a line of juice containers, upon Bruce's complaint that it
had to pay a discriminatory high price for the 31Y16 inch ISCAN after being
refused the 3126 inch can at the lower net price its competitors were paying.
These several ISCANS were adjudged of "like grade and quality," for the
court felt "satisfied" they "were all of commercial grade and quality and gave
substantially identical performance. Certainly all of the cans were adapted for
the function for which they were sold and purchased, to wit, as containers of
juice, and they were 'the same kind of goods.' ",48 Detriment to competition
was inferred from a "retardation" of Bruce's growth in marketing canned fruit
juices in competition with other canners.49
45. Id. at 6. See note 89 infra.
46. E. Edelmann & Co., FTC Dkt. 5770, at 7 (March 5, 1954). However, other price
discrimination charges in this and several companion proceedings were sustained, culminat-
ing in cease and desist orders. E. Edelmann & Co., FTC Dkt. 5770 (May 10, 1955), and
cases cited in note 88 infra.
47. 87 F. Supp. 985, 987 (S.D. Fla. 1949), aff'd, 187 F.2d 919, 924 (5th Cir.),
modified on rehearing, 190 F.2d 73, 74 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 342 U.S. 875 (1951).
Boss Mfg. Co. v. Payne Glove Co., 71 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1934) was decided under the pre-
Robinson-Patman provisions of the Clayton Act. See note 64 infra for tangentially Iprrti-
nent decisions.
48. 87 F. Supp. at 987; cf. 187 F.2d at 924.
49. 87 F. Supp. at 992; 187 F.2d at 923. Judgment for $215,000, including statutory
attorney's fees and trebled damages, was entered in Bruce's favor as a result of this liti-
gation which involved several types of alleged price discriminations on American's part.
Contrast the court's theory of "automatic damages" with American Can Co. v. Russell-
ville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38, 55-56 (8th Cir. 1951), and Sun Cosmetic Shoppe, Inc. v.
Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 150, 153 (2d Cir. 1949). But cf. Elizabeth Arden
Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1945) ; Enterprise Industries, Inc.
v. The Texas Co., 136 F. Supp. 420 (D. Conn. 1955).
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However, the Federal Trade Commission's 1953 Champion Spark Plug dis-
missal rested on minute physical distinctions among differently priced prod-
ucts.O Champion was charged with selling "special brand spark plugs to Mont-
gomery Ward & Company at approximately 18 cents per plug while it sells its
regular Champion brand spark plugs to its distributors at approximately 26
cents per plug."'51 But the special brand plugs varied slightly from Champion's
regular product, containing different insulators and "ribs. '52 The FTC trial
staff conceded that the differentiated plugs were not of "like grade and quality,"
and the Commission ultimately dismissed these charges for lack of proof.
On the other hand, the Commission's 1956 General Foods decision not only
adopted a looser construction of "like grade and quality" and a harsh test of
competitive "injury," but imposed far-reaching promotional restrictions on
suppliers of differentiated products.5 3 The company marketed its household
groceries through conventional wholesalers, but simultaneously adapted a line
of specially packaged commercial groceries for distribution through Institution
Contract Wagon Distributors who specialized in aggressive promotional selling
to the "institution trade" comprising restaurants and hotels. In recognition of
his manifold marketing functions, the ICWD received a 2.4 per cent to 4 per
cent discount from wholesale list price for coffee, the chief institutional staple,
and a 10 per cent reduction on other groceries.5 4 General Foods was convicted
of "injurious" price discrimination and illegal failure to supply all competing
distributors, i.e., conventional wholesalers, with institution-pack groceries on
"proportionally equal terms."
50. Champion Spark Plug Co., FTC Dkt. 3977, para. 10 (July 10, 1953). This phase
was part of a broader attack on Champion's pricing and distribution practices which re-
sulted in partial findings of violation and an order to cease and desist. On the Champion
case generally, see DIRLAM & KAHiN, FAIR COMPETITION: THE LAW AND EcoNomics OF
ANTITRUST POLIcy 216-25 (1954); Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition, and Con-
fusion: Another Look at Robinson-Patman, 60 YALE L.J. 929, 951-55 (1951).
51. Amended Complaint, para. 7 (June 27, 1947). The complaint arose from a claim
in the Montgomery Ward mail-order catalogue that its "Riverside" and "Ward Standard"
brand plugs were manufactured by "one of America's leading spark plug manufacturers,
using the same materials as in its own well known plugs."
52. Official Transcript of Hearings at 682-745. The functional significance, if any,
of this physical variation was not revealed.
53. General Foods Corp., FTC Dkt. 6018 (Feb. 15, 1956), adopting Initial Decision
(March 2, 1955). The case is analyzed in Rowe, Borderland Issues in Court and Comnis-
sion Cases under Sections 2 and 3 of the Clayton Act, ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW
PRO EEDINGS 60,67-69 (April 1956).
54. According to the FTC, the Institution Contract Wagon Distributor, "usually a
relatively small operator," sold directly from his truck to the customer's kitchen in fre-
quent deliveries to assure constantly fresh supplies, and performed a multitude of promo-
tional activities, such as: stocking replacement parts; servicing coffee-making equipment;
performance of repairs, adjustments, and 24-hour emergency service; loaning equipment
to customers; recipe service; arrangement of the customers' inventory and the removal of
stale and damaged merchandise; product displays; and supplying free demonstrations and
promotional materials. FTC Decision at 2.
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As a first step, the price differentials were held "injurious" to competition
whenever conventional wholesalers paid more. The FTC brushed aside the
claim that the differential merely compensated the Institution Distributor for
the performance of extra distributive functions shunned by conventional whole-
salers. Competitive detriment was inferred from the Institution Distributor's
resales "at very small markups, forcing conventional wholesale grocers to re-
duce their customary markups, and consequently their profits, to meet ICWD
competition."' 5
The Commission next adjudged the groceries to be of "like grade and quality"
irrespective of packaging or adaptation,5 6 and decreed General Foods' duty to
offer the institution-packed goods to one and all. General Foods cereals and
dessert preparations were differentiated largely by size and wrapping, but the
institution-pack coffee boasted an "additional kind of bean" for longer fresh-
ness and a distinct coloration and aroma. The Commission viewed this product
differentiation inadequate to overcome the "presumption that the two packs are
of like grade and quality" arising from the marketing of both under the single
Maxwell House brand.)7 Moreover, the Commission then characterized the
entire General Foods packaging program as providing "services" and "facilities"
subject to mandatory availability to all competing customers on "proportionally
equal terms."'58 In net effect, the FTC forced General Foods to distribute its
institution-type products through ICWD's and conventional wholesalers alike,
under compulsory price uniformity irrespective of their divergent marketing
functions.59
The most recent FTC proceeding, Atalanta Trading Corp.,00 erected an-
other promotional limitation on the foundation of General Foods. The Initial
55. The examiner had excluded such proof on the traditional ground that "a seller
cannot justify allowances to purchasers which, in fact, constitute payment to them for doing
their own work in the resale of goods purchased and owned -by them." Initial Decision
at 11.
56. Although "like grade and quality" is not an express requirement in § 2(e), the
Commission implied that condition in accord with the § 2(d) precedent of Golf Ball Manu-
facturers Ass'n, 26 F.T.C. 824, 851 (1938). See FTC Decision at 8-9; Initial Decision at
17. For text and analysis of these provisions, see note 103 infra and accompanying text.
57. Initial Decision at 17. The Initial Decision also discarded as "without relation-
ship to" and of "no effect upon the grade and quality of the coffee" the "variations in the
kinds of grind of both types of Maxwell House coffee-fine, regular, drip, glassmaker,
pulverized-and [the] variety of packs suitable for convenient use in various sizes and types
of coffee-making equipment." Ibid.
58. FTC Decision at 8; Initial Decision at 17. See note 103 infra and accompanying
text.
59. The FTC's cease and desist order not only banned price discriminations in the sale
of goods of "like grade and quality," but also prohibited "furnishing to any purchaser any
such products packaged in containers of a certain size and style, unless all purchasers of
such products competing in the resale thereof are accorded the opportunity to purchase
such products, packaged in containers of like size and style, on proportionally equal terms."
Initial Decision at 18-19.
60. FTC Dkt. 6464, at 4 (May 21, 1956). The Initial Decision is presently pending
before the Commission on review.
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Decision held that "ham is ham"-and of "like grade and quality" whether
cooked, smoked, or raw, and regardless of size or packaging, so long as the
variations uniformly carried the producer's brand. 61 Accordingly, the case out-
lawed a producer's payments to dealers for plugging his newly launched varia-
tion of Unox hams unless corresponding benefits were offered to all competing
distributors of any "like grade and quality" Unox hams-whether they handled
the featured product innovation or not.
ANALYSIS OF CONTROLLING DOCTRINES
In the perspective of two decades of Robinson-Patman, the legality of a
seller's program of product differentiation centers on these current interpreta-
tions: (1) the wavering criterion of "like grade and quality" that brings the
act's bans into play; (2) the condition of detriment to competition, now vir-
tually presumed from a price differential; (3) the cost justification, which pro-
vides uncertain and expensive sanctuary for some differentials; (4) the "pay-
ments" and "services" provisions that may dissipate promotional programs
or even bar the separate distribution of differentiated goods.
"Like Grade and Quality"
Despite the crucial status of "like grade and quality" as a threshold control
over the application of the act, twenty years of Robinson-Patman have left the
law in flux. 62 Precedent declares only the obvious with certainty: products
made from inferior components are not of "like grade and quality" with better
goods; and inconsequential variations in labeling will not dispel otherwise "like
grade and quality."63 Beyond this the contours of the law recede into con-
fusion.0 4
61. Id. at 4, 5. Seen by the Initial Decision, such differentiations created "a distinction
without a difference, more fanciful than real," and amounted to "no more than the dis-
tinction between sizes of the same shoe or the same dress."
62. Legal commentary on this provision is sparse. See Ar'xY GEN. REP. 156-59;
AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEmS UNDER TiE ROBINSON-PATMAN
ACT 38-40, 118-20 (rev. ed. 1953) ; OPPENHEIM, UNFAIR TRADE PRACrICES 1031-38 (1950) ;
Comment, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 225, 231-32 (1.954) ; Mason, Discriminate in Price Between
Different Purchasers of Commodities of Like Grade, Quality and Popularity, ABA SEC-
TION OF ANTITRUST LAW PROCEEDINGS 82 (Aug. 1953).
63. Boss Mfg. Co. v. Payne Glove Co., 71 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1934) ; 81 CoNG. REc.
App. 2337, 2339 (1937) ; Hansen Inoculator Co., 26 F.T.C. 303, 309 (1938).
64. In addition to the expository rulings discussed in the preceding text, other tangen-
tial decisions involved the "grade and quality" provision.
Several companion FTC rulings of minor significance rejected contentions that volume
price differentials for a line of automobile supplies sold as a unit---each item within the line
thus differing from the others and not "interchangeable"-could not give rise to price dis-
criminations as between goods of "like grade and quality." These Initial Decisions reasoned
that respondents having on their own initiative combined various items into a "line" were
estopped from asserting that each single item within this "line" was not of "like grade and
quality" with every other. Moog Industries, Inc., FTC Dkt. 5723, at 11 (March 8, 1954) ;
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As for product differentiation by means of brand, current doctrine is beset
with inconsistency. Since legislative history implied only that brand or design
distinctions as such should not oust the act's application, the FTC in 1937 felt
free to accord liberal scope to "grade and quality" by basing dismissals on
product distinctions arising from "private brand or trademark" and matching
designs.6 5 But a progressive legal depreciation of brand distinctions followed.
In the absence of any pertinent judicial interpretation, the Commission since
1938 has consistently disregarded even nationally promoted brands as contra-
P. & D. Mfg. Co., FTC Dkt. 5913, at 6 (Dec. 20, 1954). The Commission sustained these
rulings. FTC Dkt. 5723, at 8 (May 10, 1955) ; FTC Dkt. 5913, at 4 (April 26, 1956) ; and
see Whitaker Cable Corp., FTC Dkt. 5722, at 3 (May 10, 1955). See also cases cited in
note 66 infra.
In addition, some judicial decisions touched on the "like grade and quality" provision:
(1) In order to disprove charges that its sales of identical business machines to some
consumers at discriminatory prices unlawfully cut into the private plaintiff's competing
business in comparable machines, the defendant in McWhirter v. Monroe Calculating
Mach. Co. maintained that "the calculating machines of the two manufacturers are
not competitive in that they are not of like grade and quality." 76 F. Supp. 456, 460
(W.D. Mo. 1948). The court rightly deemed irrelevant whether the machines of the two
rival sellers were of "like grade and quality" with each other, for the real issue concerned
defendant's discriminations in the sale of its own machines of admitted "like grade and
quality." E.g., E. B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511, 518 (6th Cir. 1944). The opinion
did observe that the parties' machines despite differences in appearance and design were
"generally designed to perform the same general functions in their respective classifica-
tions" and so were "competitive." 76 F. Supp. at 461. But rather than defining the "like
grade and quality" concept, the court thus epitomized, albeit ambiguously, the facts show-
ing that the machines were sufficiently "competitive" so that one firm's discriminatory price
cutting might impair its rival's sales.
(2) Another decision held that price differentials as between a seller's combina-
tion sale and his sales of a single item could not constitute a discrimination among
goods of "like grade and quality." Package Closure Corp. v. Sealright Co., 194143 CCH
TRADE REG. REP. (Trade Cas.) ff 52969 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 141 F.2d 972, 979-80 (2d
Cir. 1944). A treble damage plaintiff who sold milk bottle hoods had charged that compet-
ing manufacturers drove him out of business by quoting unconscionably lower prices for a
cap and hood combination than for hoods sold alone. The court dismissed the complaint
as alleging only "a discrimination by defendants between purchasers of caps and purchasers
of hoods sold in combination with caps. Obviously, such discrimination was not between
purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality."
A foggy decision dismissed a brick seller's treble damag6 charge that a building con-
tractor caused it unlawful damage by bidding low on a construction project. Defend-
ant was held outside § 2(a) because its bid of brick plus building labor added up to
a "construction contract" rather than a "commodity sale" within the purview of the Robin-
son-Patman Act. General Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Construction Co., 132 F.2d 425
(6th Cir. 1942). Just what constitutes a "commodity" within the meaning of the Clayton
Act remains a hazy proposition. Cf. Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S.
594, 609 n.27 (1953) and cases cited; Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, CCH
TRADE REG. REP. (1956 Trade Cas.) ff 68468, at 11965 (2d Cir. Aug. 31, 1956) ; Pennsyl-
vania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 184 F.2d 552,
559 (4th Cir. 1950) ; Christmas Club, 25 F.T.C. 1116 (1937).
65. See text at p. 9 supra.
[Vol. 66:1
PRICE DIFFERENTIALS
dicting "like grade and quality" in comparison with unadvertised variations
sold at lower prices. 0 Yet paradoxically, the Commission has not only accorded
controlling weight to nationally advertised brands in other Robinson-Patman
contexts ;6z it has indeed construed brand identities as evidencing "like grade
and quality." General Foods, emulated by Atalanta Trading, maintained that
a uniform producer's brand created a "presumption" of "like grade and quality"
which even substantial physical disparities in the differentiated products failed
to "overcome."' 8 Thus, while the Commission on the one hand ignored brand
distinctions as disproving "like grade and quality" of physically "same" goods,
it viewed brand identity as proving the "like grade and quality" of physically
different products.
As applied to physical distinctions, administration of the "like grade and
quality" provision is also wracked by contradictions. The Federal Trade Com-
mission's 1937 dismissals once again adopted a liberal approach, and considered
differences in style, size, trimmings and physical components decisive elements
in comparing a product's "grade." 69 But without reference to these rulings, the
Bruce's Juices decision in 1951 proclaimed a broader doctrine equating "like
grade and quality" with functional interchangeability and extending the act to
price differentials for "the same kind of goods." 70 The later Sylvania and Edel-
mann Initial Decisions also invoked a concept of functional interchangeability.
7'
66. See text at pp. 10-11 supra, and also Fruitvale Canning Co., FTC Dkt. 5989 (June
15, 1956) ; Page Dairy Co., FTC Dkt. 5974 (Oct. 30, 1953) adopting Initial Decision (Sept.
11, 1953) where brand and labeling distinctions were disregarded as legally insignificant.
67. According to the Commission, "public acceptance rather than chemical analysis of
the product is the important competitive factor," so that "off-brand or local-brand gasoline
sells at lower prices than major brands, and distributors of off-brand gasoline find it
necessary to undersell major brands in order to secure some share of the market." Standard
Oil Co., 49 F.T.C. 923, 952 (1953), rev'd on other grounds, 233 F.2d 649 (7th Cir.
1956). Conversely, a premium brand product when nominally matching the price of a
lesser known product lacking comparable consumer acceptance would in truth be under-
cutting it in the market-so that the Commission may refuse to honor a seller's statutory
defense that such a discriminatory price reduction was made in good faith merely to meet
the competitor's equally low price. In its Minneapolis-Honeywell decision the Commission
rejected a "meeting competition" defense partly because respondent's temperature controls
sold "at a premium price" attributable to "a large customer demand for, and public accep-
tance of" Minneapolis-Honeywell products which enabled their sale "at prices higher than
those charged by its competitors." 44 F.T.C. 351, 396-97 (1948), rev'd on other grounds,
191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951). The Commission in a similar context also took account of
the distinct price margins related to consumers' preferences cultivated through promotion
of bakers' yeast. Standard Brands, Inc., 46 F.T.C. 1485, 1495 (1950), aff'd, 189 F.2d 510
(2d Cir. 1951) ; cf. the complaints issued against Anheuser-Busch, Inc., FTC Dkt. 6331
(April 19, 1955), and Pure Oil Co., FTC Dkt. 6640 (Sept. 26, 1956), charging local price
reductions in nationally advertised products to the alleged detriment of the lesser promoted
products of rivals.
68. See text at pp. 13-15 supra.
69. See text at p. 9 supra.
70. See text at p. 12 supra.
71. See text at pp. 11-12 supra.
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Yet the FTC's Champion Spark Plug dismissal in 1953 ignored Bruce's Juices
and relied on minuscule distinctions in the construction of manifestly inter-
changeable products.72
Some tentative generalizations can superficially reconcile the inconsistencies
pervading the subtler interpretations of "like grade and quality": Distinctions
in brand alone may not dispel the "like grade and quality" of otherwise identical
products.7 3 By a preponderance of precedent, physically differentiated products
may satisfy the standard of "like grade and quality" if "functionally inter-
changeable." 74 However, when minor physical differentiations go hand in hand
with a brand variation-the factual portrait of the Champion Spark Plug case
.- "like grade and quality" may be disproved notwithstanding evident "func-
tional interchangeability. '75 Also, in areas where a test of "functional inter-
changeability" spawns absurdity-for instance, by holding all foods "inter-
changeable" for eating and hence legally alike-that concept may not be invoked
at all. Instead, an existing brand identity may cancel even significant physi-
cal distinctions and facilitate a conclusion of "like grade and quality."7 6
But more significant than nice logical reconciliations is that no appellate
review to date has evaluated and resolved the existing anomalies and contradic-
tions in the interpretation of "like grade and quality."
77
Competitive "Injury"
Contrary to the uncertainties surrounding "like grade and quality," the tests
of competitive "injury" have hardened into rigidity. The "injury" requirement
has evolved into an almost automatic inference from the differential itself, in
72. See text at p. 13 supra.
73. United States Rubber Co., 46 F.T.C. 998, 1006-09 (1950) ; United States Rubber
Co., 28 F.T.C. 1489, 1500 (1939); Hansen Inoculator Co., 26 F.T.C. 303, 309 (1938);
Fruitvale Canning Co., FTC Dkt. 5989 (June 15, 1956); Sylvania Elec. Co., FTC Dkt.
5728 (Dec. 8, 1953); Page Dairy Co., FTC Dkt. 5974 (Oct. 30, 1953), adopting Initial
Decision (Sept. 11, 1953).
74. Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985, 987 (S.D. Fla. 1949), aff'd,
187 F.2d 919, 924 (5th Cir. 1951) ; Sylvania Elec. Co., FTC Dkt. 5728, at 3 (Dec. 8, 1953) ;
E. Edelmann & Co., FTC Dkt. 5770, at 6 (March 5, 1954) ; see McWhirter v. Monroe
Calculating Mach. Co., 76 F. Supp. 456, 461 (W.D. Mo. 1948). But cf. Informal FTC
Opinions, 81 CONG. REc. A'i. 2337 (1937). The statement of prevailing law by the Attor-
ney General's Committee is on the cheery side: "Actual and genuine physical differentia-
tions between two different products adapted to the several buyers' uses, and not merely
a decorative or fanciful feature, probably remove differential pricing of the two from the
reach of the Robinson-Patman Act." Ar'y GEN. REP. 158.
75. Champion Spark Plug Co., FTC Dkt. 3977, para. 10 (July 10, 1953).
76. General Foods Corp., FTC Dkt. 6018 (Feb. 15, 1956), adopting Initial Decision at
17 (March 2, 1955) ; Atalanta Trading Corp., FTC Dkt. 6464, at 5 (May 21, 1956).
77. Actually, the Commission's denial of recognition to brand differentials as determi-
nants of "like grade and quality" prevailed by consent in the United States Rubber pro-
ceedings, and rested on stipulation in the Sylvania case. The Edelinann respondent had no
occasion to challenge the finding of "like grade and quality" since that phase of the case
was dismissed on other grounds.
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the special context of differential pricing for differentiated products as else-
where.
78
To be sure, the FTC's 1936 Goddyear tire proceeding, decided under the
original Clayton Act, accorded a penetrating analysis to the private brand price
differentials at bar.79 Impairment of competition was adjudged only after a
searching comparative evaluation of the operating margins of the recipients of
the challenged prices. The FTC duly considered the premium price that the
nationally advertised Goodyear brand tire commanded in the consumer market
in comparison with the Sears private brand, and undertook a thorough appraisal
of Sears' resale pricing policies and their competitive impact in relation to the
attrition of rivals in tire distribution.
FTC rulings under the 1936 amendments, however, shirked such market
analysis and inferred "injury" to competition as a matter of course. The findings
of "injury" in the United States Rubber cases were perfunctory and uncon-
tested paraphrases of the statutory text.80 In the view of the litigated and more
explicit Sylvania Initial Decision, "injury" stemmed from Philco's "ability"
"at times" to underbid Sylvania's price to its distributors, while Philco's dis-
tributors and its own sales subsidiary were "encouraged" to undersell Sylvania
distributors in resales to the retail trade.8' The conclusion of "injury" did not
even attempt to relate the price differentials in Philco's favor to the actual re-
78. The recent trends are discussed and analyzed in Rowe, Borderland Issues in Court
and Commission Cases under Sections 2 and 3 of the Clayton Act, ABA SECTION OF ANTI-
TRUST L.%w PROCEEDINGS 60-72 (April 1956). Compare Comment, The "New" Federal
Trade Con,mission and the Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws, 65 YALE L.J. 34, 67-81
(1955).
Among earlier legal surveys, see Avr'Y GEN. REP. 160-70, 202-09; Kintner, The Re-
vitaliced Federal Trade Commission-A Two-Year Evaluation, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1143,
1155 (1955) ; Sunderland, Antitrust Developments: A New Era for Competitive Pricing,
41 A.B.A.J. 113 (1955) ; Comments, The "Injury" Requirement of the Robinson-Patmnan
Act, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 197 (1954), and The Standard of Injury Applicable to First-Line
Competition, id. at 209; AUSTIN, PRICE DIscRImINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER
THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 40-54 (rev. ed. 1953) ; Levy, Functional Pricing, U. MIcH.
INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 116 (1953) ; Note, Functional Discounts Under
the Robinson-Patman Act: The Standard Oil Litigation, 67 HARv. L. REv. 294 (1953) ;
Kelley, Functional Discounts Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 526
(1952) ; Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts To A Revised National
Antitrust Policy, 50 MICH. L. Rzv. 1139, 1193-1213 (1952) ; Rowe, Price Discrimination,
Competition and Confusion: Another Look at Robinson-Patman, 60 YALE L.J. 929, 942-45
(1951) ; Simon, The Fantasy of the Phrase "Injury To Competition," 15 LAW & CONTEm.P.
PROB. 258 (1950) ; Austern, Required Competitive Injury and Permitted Meeting of Com-
petition, CCH ROBINSON-PAT MAN ACT SymPosium 63, 73 (1947); Shniderman, The
Tyranny of Labels-A Study of Functional Discounts Under The Robinson-Patan, Act,
60 HARv. L. REv. 571. (1947); Van Cise, Functional Prices, CCH ROBINSON-PATMtAN
AcT Sv.nPosi u 89 (1947).
79. See text at pp. 5-6 supra.
80. See United States Rubber Co., 46 F.T.C. 998, 1011 (1950) ; United States Rubber
Co., 28 F.T.C. 1489, 1501 (1939). See also Hansen Inoculator Co., 26 F.T.C. 303 (1938).
81. Sylvania Elec. Products Co., FTC Dkt. 5728, at 7 (Dec. 8, 1953), set aside on
other grounds by FTC (Sept. 23, 1954).
19561
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
sale price tactics of Philco distributors and their bearing on competition with
the distributors of Sylvania tubes, and omitted any inquiry into Philco's off-
setting expenditures for advertising and promotion to gain for Philco tubes a
customer appeal comparable to Sylvania's brand. The Commission's General
Foods ruling held that competitive "injury" was wrought by a minor price
differential in favor of the Independent Contract Wagon Distributors who sold
"at very small mark-ups, forcing conventional wholesale grocers to reduce their
customary mark-ups, and consequently their profits. ' - 2 Apart from this dubious
detriment to "competition," the FTC ruling ignored the substantial off-setting
expenses incurred by ICWND's in performing a host of valuable promotional
functions shunned by the conventional wholesalers who paid the higher price.8 3
Far from being extraordinary or vindictive rulings peculiar to differentiated
goods, these cases symptomize the prevailing tendency to equate a price differ-
ential with competitive "injury. '14 In 1948 the Supreme Court's Morton Salt
decision invalidated a seller's quantity discounts by discerning the statutory
detriment to competition from "what would appear to be obvious, that the com-
petitive opportunities of certain merchants were injured when they had to pay
respondent substantially more for their goods than their competitors had to
pay."'8 5 But the Minneapolis-Honeywell decision of the court of appeals 813 in
1951 and the FTC's Doubleday ruling 87 in 1955 stressed the limitations of that
doctrine in market settings where pertinent countervailing factors operated to
neutralize the effects of a nominal price differential. The most recent Commis-
sion decisions, however, have abandoned such market analysis and instead pro-
jected Morton Salt so as to condemn almost any price differential among rival
customers as "injurious" per se.
8 8
The Edelnzann dismissal of discriminatory pricing charges thus remains a
lone odd legal twist. The challenged differentials were held incapable of caus-
82. General Foods Corp., FTC Dkt. 6018, at 4 (Feb. 15, 1956).
83. See note 54supfra.
84. For a critique of this doctrine of "microscopic substantiality" in measuring com-
petitive detriment, see Rowe, Borderland Issues in Court and Commission Cases under
Sections 2 and 3 of the Clayton Act, ABA SEcTION OF ANTITRUST LAW PROCEEDINGS 60-
72, 81-82 (April 1956). However, these automatic inferences of "injury" on the customer
level have recently been disavowed in cases involving competitive impairment among the
seller's own rivals. See id. at 70-71 ; note 155 infra.
85. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 46-47 (1948). Cf. Samuel H. Moss, Inc.
v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1945).
86. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert.
dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952).
87. Doubleday & Co., FTC Dkt. 5897, at 5 (Aug. 31, 1955). Owing to an ambiguous
concurrence by one Commissioner in Chairman Howrey's opinion, some doubt attends the
status of this 3-2 decision as an expression of majority policy.
88. In addition to the General Foods decision, see P. Sorensen Mfg. Co., FTC Dkt.
6052 (June 29, 1956) ; Fruitvale Canning Co., FTC Dkt. 5989 (June 15, 1956) ; C. E. Nie-
hoff & Co., FTC Dkt. 5768 (May 17, 1955) ; P. & D. Mfg. Co., FTC Dkt. 5913 (April 26,
1956); Whitaker Cable Corp., FTC Dkt. 5722 (May 10, 1955); Moog Industries, Inc.,
FTC Dkt. 5723 (May 10, 1955) ; E. Edelmann & Co., FTC Dkt. 5770 (May 10, 1955). Cf.
National Lead Co. v. FTC, 227 F.2d 825, 835 (7th Cir. 1955).
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ing competitive "injury" by reason of alleged exclusionary arrangements where-
by the independent distributor who paid the higher price was foreclosed by the
private brand customers from bidding for resales to their "controlled" fran-
chised outlets while they refrained from competing for resales to his accountss 9
The Edelmann rationale can of course hold only so long as the recipients of the
seller's prices do not themselves compete directly in resale to the general public.
More important, however, is that the foreclosure of rivals from access to sub-
stantial markets by means of exclusionary tactics offends the Sherman and
Clayton Acts."' Few future proceedings are likely to exonerate a price differen-
tial for lack of competitive "injury" owing to circumstances that invite prose-
cution under another branch of antitrust.
In light of prevailing Robinson-Patman doctrine, therefore, a seller seeking
to vindicate differential pricing in a program of product differentiation cannot
bank on the competitive "injury" requirement of the act.
Cost Justification
As one of the defenses for exculpating "injurious" and hence prima facie
illegal price discriminations, the statutory cost justification has provided un-
certain shelter for price differentials among differentiated goods.91
Cost justifications have sporadically vindicated private brand differentials.
At first, United States Rubber in 1939 failed to cost-justify its price differen-
tial in the sale of nationally advertised and private brand tires when the Com-
mission rejected accounting studies which demonstrated "only" 95 per cent of
the challenged price spread as corresponding to cost economies in dealing with
private brand accounts. 2 In the subsequent footwear proceeding, United States
Rubber came closer to the mark by cost-justifying several of the differentials
at issue. 3 In 1953 B.F. Goodrich and Sylvania finally succeeded in justifying
89. E. Edelmann & Co., FTC Dkt. 5770, at 6-7 (March 5, 1954). Notably, no officials
of the oil and tire companies in question had the opportunity to refute these charges, made
in a proceeding to which they were not party. The issue of dealer domination is presently
before the FTC in three cases attacking "overriding commissions" paid by tire to oil
companies in connection with the sale of TBA products through franchised outlets. Com-
plaints in FTC Dkts. 6485-6487 (Jan. 11, 1956).
90. See, e.g., Ar'y GEN. REP. 144-45; Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337
U.S. 293, 314 (1949) ; International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
91. The statutory cost justification is analyzed in Avr'y GEN. REP. 170-75; Sawyer,
Cost Justification of Quantity Differentials, 1 ANTITRUST BULL. 573 (1956) ; Kintner,
The Revitalized Federal Trade Commission-A Two-Year Evaluation, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1143, 1162-64 (1955); Comment, 49 Nw. U.L. REV. 237 (1954); AUSTIN, PRICE Dis-
CRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEIS UNDER THEE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 56-66 (rev.
ed. 1953) ; Adelman, The Consistency of the Robinson-Patman Act, 6 STAN. L. REV. 3,
9-13 (1953) ; Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition and Confusion: Another Look at
Robinson-Patman, 60 YALE L.J. 929, 961-65 (1951) ; Note, 65 HARv. L. REV. 1011 (1952) ;
Fuchs, The Requirement of Exactness in the Justification of Price and Service Differen-
tials under the Robinson-Patman Act, 30 TEXAS L. Rw. 1 (1951) ; Sawyer, Accounting
and Statistical Proof in Price Discrimination Cases, 36 IowA L. REv. 244 (1951).
92. United States Rubber Co., 28 F.T.C. 1489, 1502 (1939) ; see note 37 supra.
93. United States Rubber Co., 46 F.T.C. 998, 1011-12 (1950) ; see note 39 supra.
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private brand differentials in their entirety, Goodrich by grace of a de mininis
principle which winked at some minor price spreads not fully accounted for . 4
But these successes entailed herculean exertions which may never advance
the Robinson-Patman jurisprudence of the future. As exemplified by Sylvania's
cost study, the most recent of the few validated by the FTC, cost justification
is a huge task demanding vast investments in time and professional talent. Over
a period of seven months more than 3,C00 man hours under the supervision of
corporate officers as well as independent CPA's were devoted to the prepara-
tion of Sylvania's cost study-which additionally secured the imprimatur of
sound accounting practice bestowed by a knowledgeable professional authority
on matters of Robinson-Patman accountancy. 95 The B.F. Goodrich cost justi-
fication consumed a comparable quantum of talent and time. Yet B.F. Goodrich
and the second United States Rubber case culminated in stipulations among
FTC staff and respondent's counsel for mutually agreeable disposition of the
accounting issues. The Commission was thereby spared all articulation of a
ratio decidendi, and instead announced simply its ultimate verdict-without
reasoned analysis and bare of legal guidance or precedent value. The Sylvania
dismissal was scarcely more revealing. 96 Although the Commission compli-
mented the "sound accounting principles" permeating Sylvania's cost presenta-
tion, it never divulged these principles for the benefit of future respondents.
Whatever the obstacles thus confronting a cost justification for differentiated
products, the general annals of Robinson-Patman accountancy imply even
bleaker legal prospects. Epitomized by the FTC's disapproval of a 95 per cent
justification presented by United States Rubber in 1939, the mathematical ex-
actitude required of accounting studies has engendered warfare over trifles.
Respondents have been foiled by a reluctance on the part of FTC accountants
to articulate their criticisms and objections in writing,97 and an inclination of
94. Sylvania Elec. Products, Inc., FTC Dkt. 5723 (Sept. 23, 1954); B.F. Goodrich
Co., FTC Dkt. 5677 (Jan. 22, 1954), adopting Initial Decision (Dec. 10, 1953). The Initial
Decision recited that all of respondent's challenged differentials were cost-justified except
for one discount bracket covering less than 2 of 1% of its footwear sales in 1949. Id. at 2.
95. See Appeal Brief for Respondent Sylvania before FTC, at 22-24.
96. A lucid and expository concurring opinion was filed separately by Chairman How-
rey. The majority Sylvania opinion approved Sylvania's "weighted average" method of
cost justification for its line of tubes whose price differentials were at issue. The "weighted
average" method first ascertained the average price per tube paid by its distributors. That
total was compared with the hypothetical total they would have paid for the same tubes if
accorded the lower prices quoted to Philco. (In this way, 'Proper weight was accorded to
the volume in which each tube type was sold, since some types moved in larger quantities
than others.) The cost study then sought to demonstrate how additional distribution costs
justified charging this additional aggregate amount to Sylvania distributors. The narrow
FTC opinion sanctioned this technique because in the case at bar the volume of consumer
appeal of any particular tube type sold by Sylvania was entirely unrelated to the amount
of the price differentials at issue, and because the size of the price spread for an individual
tube had no independent significance for the competitive situation on the resale level.
97. FTC accountants have often confined their adversary appearances to oral testi-
mony. Taggart, Cost Justification under the Robinson-Patinan Act, J. Accountancy, June
1956, pp. 52, 56.
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the tribunal to accord virtually insuperable respect to the opinions of staff
accountants appearing in aid of the prosecution's case.98 Most discouraging has
been the absence of guiding policy or precedent for predicting the reception
likely to face a cost project on staff or decisional levels at the FTC.99
There being "no rules of the game," the consensus concedes that "the cost
defense has proved largely illusory."' 00 In statistical confirmation, only four
cost justifications in recorded cases have succeeded in fully vindicating chal-
lenged price differentials in twenty years of Robinson-Patman enforcement.'-0
The Supreme Court has aptly observed that "proof of a cost justification being
what it is, too often no one can ascertain whether a price is cost-justified.
'10 2
As a legal defense for price spreads among differentiated products, a cost
justification under prevailing doctrine thus remains an expensive gamble at best.
"Paynents" and "Services"
Brought into play upon a finding that differentiated goods are of "like grade
and quality," the "payments" and "services" provisions impose an indetermi-
nate range of legal restrictions on a seller's promotional and distribution
plans.
1 03
98. See ATT'Y GEN. REP. 173.
99. "Confusion arises because the FTC accountants seem to insist that each case be
decided individually without much reference to what prior cases have held." Comment,
49 Nw. U.L. REv. 237, 239 n.10 (1954).
100. See concurring opinion of Chairman Howrey in Sylvania Elec. Products, Inc.,
FTC Dkt. 5728, at 5-6 (Oct. 27, 1954), echoing the conclusion of the A'rry GEN. REP. 171.
101. In addition to the successful cost justifications in B.F. Goodrich and Sylvania,
the FTC has validated cost justifications in their entirety in Horlicks Corp., 47 F.T.C. 169
(1950) and Bird & Son, Inc., 25 F.T.C. 548 (1937). Cost justification partly succeeded
in United States Rubber Co., 46 F.T.C. 998 (1950) and Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator
Co., 44 F.T.C. 351 (1948). Moreover, cost justifications conceivably contributed to dis-
missal of other cases where it was one among several tendered defenses. Reid v. Harper
& Bros., 235 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co., 40 F.T.C. 738 (1945) ;
Kraft-PhenLx Co., 25 F.T.C. 537 (1937). On the other hand, cost justifications have been
wholly disapproved in at least eleven cases of record. Fruitvale Canning Co., FTC Dkt.
5989 (June 15, 1956); C. E. Niehoff & Co., FTC Dkt. 5768 (May 17, 1955); Champion
Spark Plug Co., FTC Dkt. 3977 (July 10, 1953) ; International Salt Co., 49 F.T.C. 138
(1952) ; Curtiss Candy Co., 44 F.T.C. 237 (1947) ; Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263 (1945);
IMorton Salt Co., 39 F.T.C. 35 (1944) ; E. B. Muller & Co., 33 F.T.C. 24 (1941) ; Standard
Brands, Inc., 29 F.T.C. 121. (1939). See also Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 87 F.
Supp. 985 (S.D. Fla. 1949), aff'd, 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951) ; Russellville Canning Co.
v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 484 (W.D. Ark. 1949), rev'd, 191 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1951).
102. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 79 (1953).
103. Section 2(d) of the act, 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1952), declares
it unlawful
"to pay or contract for the payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of a
customer of such person . . .as compensation or in consideration for any services
or facilities furnished by or through such customer in connection with the processing,
handling, sale, or offering for sale of any products or commodities manufactured,
sold, or offered for sale by such person, unless such payment or consideration is
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Under current interpretations, the "like grade and quality" issue controls not
only the pricing aspects of a program of product differentiation but its market-
ing strategy as well. Sections 2(d) and (e) of the act forbid all payments for a
customer's benefit in recognition of "services or facilities" on his part as well
as the furnishing of such "services or facilities" by the seller himself-unless
offered on "proportionally equal" terms to all competing distributors. 104 For
example, though the Atalanta Trading respondent wished to introduce a newly
developed ready-to-eat "Canadian Bacon" in tins among consumers by defray-
ing the in-store promotional outlays of those dealers willing to plug this
product, he was compelled to offer comparable advertising arrangements to
all competing distributors handling Unox hams of whatsoever type.105 The
legality of an advertising project conceived to finance the cooperative pro-
motion of a single featured item in a seller's differentiated line was thus con-
ditioned by section 2 (d) on the plan's extension to every other variant of "like
grade and quality." The General Foods finding of "like grade and quality"
struck at a spectacularly successful campaign of distributing specially adapted
institution-pack products to the commercial feeding trade through an aggressive
corps of Institution Contract Wagon Distributors dedicated to hard promotional
selling.10 6 For by construing the "services or facilities" of section 2(e) as en-
compassing the differentiation of products in special packs and sizes, the Com-
available on proportionally equal terms to all other customers competing in the dis-
tribution of such products or commodities."
The counterpart provisions in § 2(e), 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1952),
render it unlawful
"to discriminate in favor of one purchaser against another purchaser or purchasers
of a commodity bought for resale, with or without processing, by contracting to
furnish or furnishing, or by contributing to the furnishing of, any services or facil-
ities connected with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of such com-
modity so purchased upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on proportionally
equal terms."
For legal analysis, see ATr'y GEN. REP. 189-93; Kintner, The Revitalized Federal
Trade Commission--A Two-Year Evahation, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1143, 1168-71 (1955);
Comments, 52 MIcEr. L. REv. 1198 (1954), 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 225 (1954); AUSTIN, PRICE
DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE RoBINsoN-PATmIAN ACT 110-41
(rev. ed. 1953) ; Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition and Confusion: Another Look
at Robinson-Patman, 60 YALE L.J. 929, 959-61 (1951) ; FELDMAN & ZORN, ADVERTISING
AND PROMOTIONAL ALLOWANCES (1948); Dunn, Section 2(d) and (e), CCH ROBINSON-
PATMAN ACT SymPosIum 55 (1946).
104. See note 103 supra.
105. Atalanta Trading Corp., FTC Dkt. 6464 (May 21, 1956), discussed in text at
pp. 14-15 supra.
106. General Foods Corp., FTC Dkt. 6018 (Feb. 15, 1956). In the years of its Con-
tract Wagon Distributor plan, General Foods' total sales of institution products jumped
from $9 million to over $23 million between 1947 and 1951. And while in the correspond-
ing years sales through conventional wholesalers dropped off only 14%, sales through
ICWD's leaped practically 600%--attesting to the spectacular competitive success of the
plan. See Initial Decision at 4. By 1953, sales through ICWD's had passed $22 million,
after a $2 million volume in 1947, the first year of the plan. Ibid.
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mission forced the respondent to offer its institution-pack products simultane-




The rationale of these rulings casts complex obligations on manufacturers of
differentiated goods.'18 A legal duty to offer comparable cooperative advertis-
ing arrangements to all competing distributors of any of a seller's differentiated
products 1uo entails an onerous and costly undertaking at best, and may jeop-
ardize any campaign pitched to the promotion of one or a few featured items
in a product line through a selected channel of distribution. Similarly, a co-
operative advertising program implemented through the seller's direct pro-
vision of sales aids or marketing assistance to the distributors of only the fea-
tured product may founder on an obligation to supply comparable material to
all other distributors of his differentiated goods. Perhaps most critically, the
concept of "services or facilities" as construed by General Foods to reach the
seller's very act of furnishing a variation of a basic commodity can abort a
strategy for product differentiation-by compelling the firm selling its differen-
tiated goods through one distribution channel to market these products simul-
taneously through another unwelcome and unwanted channel.
An affirmative finding of "like grade and quality" as to a seller's differenti-
ated products thus commands conformity with the most lethal yet vaguest pro-
visions of the act. As presently construed, sections 2(d) and (e) neither pre-
suppose a showing of competitive "injury," nor permit a cost justification to
excuse prima facie violations." 0 Rather, failure to comply with these sections
is illegal per se. But even apart from the residual mysteries enveloping the
computation of the "proportionally equal terms" prescribed by these pro-
visions,"' the ambit of 2(d) and (e) is far from defined. Notwithstanding
107. In this respect, General Foods accords with an earlier Commission ruling that
a seller's refusal to supply some customers with a particular packaged version of his prod-
uct constituted a failure to "furnish" "services or facilities connected with the processing,
handling, sale, or offering for sale of such commodity." Luxor, Ltd., 31 F.T.C. 658 (1940).
But cf. Chicago Seating Co. v. S. Karpen & Bros., 177 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1949), holding
that a manufacturer's refusal to sell or furnish price lists for certain specially designed goods
to an existing customer was not actionable under § 2(e). See also Naifeh v. Ronson Art
Mletal Works, 218 F.2d 202, 205-07 (10th Cir. 1954), and Skinner v. United States Steel
Corp., 233 F.2d 762, 765 (5th Cir. 1956) ("the services or facilities that must be made
available on proportionally equal terms to all purchasers in competition are nzerchandiring
services or facilities." (Emphasis added.) ).
103. For actual examples, see text at p. 34 infra.
109. A recent leading decision held that a seller who accorded promotional benefits to
retailers must also extend them to wholesalers whose customers competed with the re-
cipients. Krug v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 142 F. Supp. 230, 236-37 (D.N.J. 1956).
110. Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 144 F.2d 211, 219 (7th Cir. 1944), aff'd, 324
U.S. 726 (1945); Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946); United
Cigar-Whelan Stores Corp. v. Weinreich Co., 107 F. Supp. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). The
Federal Trade Commission recently ruled that the "meeting competition" defense was
available against charges preferred under the "services" provisions of § 2(e) but not the
.,payments" restrictions in § 2(d). Henry Rosenfeld, Inc., FTC Dkt. 6212 (June 21, 1956).
111. See Lever Bros. Co., Procter & Gamble Co., Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., FTC
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the limited legislative objective to control discriminatory promotional deals
between buyers and sellers, 112 the "services or facilities" challenged in the past
have ranged from sales returns to warehousing arrangements to salaries of
pretty girls. 113 Nor is this all. The FTC has recently vowed sharper 2(d) and
(e) vigilance and launched an enforcement drive with a flurry of complaints
featuring novel doctrinal ex-tensions.
114
In sum, the "like grade and quality" issue trails in its wake a host of pro-
motional restrictions of indefinite scope but automatic illegality--operative
independent of the statutory qualifications or defenses for discriminatory pric-
ing.
MARKET IMPACT OF PREVAILING DOCTRINE
These formidable legal barriers confronting price differentials inevitably
generate pressure for uniform pricing on the seller's part. But in the context of
product differentiation that tendency toward price uniformity entails two con-
sequences-both at odds with accepted goals of antitrust: (1) The economic
discrimination paradoxically fostered by nominal price equality; (2) The im-
pediments to dynamic product innovation created by frozen pricing relation-
ships.
Dkts. 5585, 5586, 5587 (Dec. 16, 1953) ; and FTC Trade Practice Conference Rules for
the Cosmetics Industry with "explanatory analysis." 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. f 2022-1
(1951).
112. The legislative purpose was solely to nip discriminatory concessions disguised as
advertising or promotional deals to favored customers. See, e.g., Henry Rosenfeld, Inc.,
FTC Dkt. 6212, at 5 (June 21, 1956). That limited legislative intention is revealed in the
Committee Reports. S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936) ; H.R. RExP. No. 2287,
74th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1936). The floor debates confirm this view. See explanations
of the legislation by Senator Logan and Representative Patman, 80 CoNrG. REC. 6282, 7759
(1936), and colloquy, id. at 8123.
113. Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 47 F.T.C. 1371. (1951) ; Lambert Pharmacal Co.,
31 F.T.C. 734 (1940) ; Elizabeth Arden v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1945).
1.14. See FTC Press Release, July 22, 1956, "FTC to Launch Drive Against Dis-
crimination in Food Field," recounting staff instructions by the Commission's Chairman
"to take a hard look at promotional allowances and cooperative advertising payments made
by food suppliers to the major retail outlets." The announcement was followed by the re-
lease of nine § 2(d) complaints on July 25. FTC Dkts. 6592-6600. Concededly experiment-
ing with an unprecedented theory, these complaints charged the nine respondents-includ-
ing Pepsi-Cola, Coca Cola, General Foods, Sunshine Biscuits, as well as makers of beer
and cigarettes-with granting "indirect" promotional payments in favor of grocery chains
through purchasing broadcast time from networks which ran spot advertising plugs for
the chain groceries that had in turn given in-store promotion to the products of the respec-
tive respondents. See Wall Street Journal, July 25, 1956, p. 5, col. 1. In addition, the Com-
mission has recently charged recipients of promotional allowances with violating the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act's general bans on "unfair methods of competition," although
the provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act do not reach the acceptance of promotional
"payments" or "services." See United Cigar-Whelan Stores Corp., FTC Dkt. 6525 (July
31, 1956) ; Food Fair Stores, Inc., FTC Dkt. 6458 (Nov. 21, 1955) ; Giant Food Shopping
Center, Inc., FTC Dkt. 6459 (Nov. 21, 1955).
Actually, FTC complaints issued under §§ 2(d) and 2(e) within the past year have
dwarfed the number of proceedings instituted under any other Robinson-Patman provision.
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Fostering of Economic Discrimination
Particularly as applied to products promotionally differentiated by brand,
compulsory price uniformity enforces economic discrimination.
The prosperous American consumer in this age of abundance has progressed
far beyond the purchase of a basic commodity for satisfying elementary needs.
With growing disposable income in the hands of the buying public and more
producers vying for its favor, a premium attaches to ingenuity in distribution.1 15
Salesman and huckster have joined to transform traditional marketing into
"merchandising" powered by gimmicks, slogans, and brands. So allured, culti-
vated, conditioned--or seduced 116 -by the sloganeers and pitchmen, consumers
stand ready to pay a bonus for a brand and the real or bogus benefits it sym-
bolizes. Whatever the ultimate moralities of the matter, the cold fact is that the
public will pay more money for a nationally advertised and branded version
than it would pay for the physically same but promotionally unknown product
sans brand.1 7 A manufacturer who sells a branded and an unbranded variation
of the same basic item at a price differential is simply responsive to realities of
the marketplace.
115. The number of consumer "spending units" with annual after-tax income of over
$4,000 has about doubled since 1950 to a present total of 26 million. $4,000 is approximately
the income line at which consumers exert "discretionary" spending power after having
satisfied their basic needs. At recent rates of growth, this group which is in a position to
,'shop around" will comprise 36 million spending units by 1960. Seligman, The Amazing
Advertising Business, Fortune, Sept. 1956, pp. 107, 109. See also Burck & Parker, What
a Country), Fortune, Oct. 1956, p. 127; Barnet, Showdown in the Market Place, Harv.
Bus. Rev., July-Aug. 1956, p. 85; Silberman, Retailing: It's a New Ball Game, Fortune,
Aug. 1955, p. 7 8 .
116. Madison Avenue has now hired the wizards of psychoanalysis to probe the sub-
conscious wellsprings of purchasing behavior. The Freudian pitch forebodes a weird assort-
ment of wares pandering to human frailty, narcissism, and neurosis. See Stryker, "Moti-
vation Research," Fortune, June 1956, p. 144; cf. Martineau, It's Time to Research the
Conisumer, Harv. Bus. Rev., July-Aug. 1955, p. 54.
117. E.g., CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC ComPIETITION 56-62 (6th ed.
1948) ; BORDEN, ADvzTiSING IN OUR ECONOMY 30-31, 221-24 (1945). In the caustic prose
of an articulate skeptic:
"The buyer of an advertised good buys more than a parcel of food or fabric; he
buys the pause that refreshes, the hand that has never lost its skill, the priceless in-
gredient that is the reputation of its maker. All these may be illusions, but they cost
money to create, and if the creators can recoup their outlay, who is the poorer?
Among the many illusions which advertising can fashion are those of lavishness,
refinement, security, and romance. Suppose the monetary cost of compounding a
perfume is trivial; of what moment is this if the ads promise, and the buyer believes,
that romance, even seduction will follow its use? The economist, whose dour lexicon
defines as irrational any market behavior not dictated by a logical pecuniary cal-
culus, may think it irrational to buy illusions; but there is a degree of that kind of
irrationality even in economic man; and consuming man is full of it."
Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE
L.J. 1165,1181 (1948).
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A seller's marketing of such differentiated products through intermediate
distributors at a price differential thus cannot be deemed "discriminatory" in
any economic sense. The purchaser of the unbranded version of the seller's
product naturally pays less because he gets less. Such a distributor-for ex-
ample, a mail-order house,118 a multi-pump or "trackside" gasoline operator,"0
a grocery chain ' 20 -may resell under its own unknown and unadvertised brand
at a corresponding price spread below the manufacturer's nationally promoted
product which enjoys greater consumer appeal. In that event the distributor
buys cheaper what he must resell cheaper. Alternatively, the unbranded distrib-
utor who paid less at the outset may invest in widespread advertising and pro-
motion of his own brand in order to match the public acceptance and selling
price of the manufacturer's branded product among customers-viz., Philco
which paid less for Sylvania's unbranded tubes and then promoted them under
the Philco brand ;121 or oil companies buying unbranded tires cheaper for resale
under their own publicized brand. 2 2 Here, too, the unbranded distributor re-
118. The Goodyear branded tire sold 20-25% higher in consumer markets than the
comparable Sears "All State" tire. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 22 F.T.C. 232, 308 (1936).
119. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE SENATE SMALL BUSINESS COMifMITTEE ON PETROLEUM
MARKETING PRAcrcEs IN NEw JERSEY, S. REP. No. 2810, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, 18 (1956) ;
Dirlam & Kahn, Leadership and Conflict in the Pricing of Gasoline, 61. YALE L.J. 818, 833
(1952). The authors aptly remark that "when the national brand is removed, the discount
from the tank wagon price is not discriminatory, strictly speaking, . . . since a different
and inferior product in the economic sense is being sold." Id. at 833 n.48.
120. For an illustrative account, see Battle of Brands, Supermarkets Step Up Use of
Private Labels, Wall Street Journal, July 11, 1956, p.. 1, col. 1:
"Take the scene that presented itself to shoppers on a recent weekend at a Detroit
A&P store. There in its red label splendor was a six-ounce jar of General Foods
Corp.'s Maxwell House instant coffee for $1.49. But right next to it, also in a red
label, was a six-ounce jar of A&P instant for $1.29. A half-pound of Salada tea was
offered for 81 cents, competing with a half-pound of Nectar tea for 59 cents.
"Among the other products that glistened on the shelves were: Ann Page chile
sauce, noodles and spaghetti; Sunnyfield butter, wheat puffs, and flour; Jane Parktr
bread, rolls, and cakes; Bright Sail insect powder and floor wax. All of these prod-
ucts carried lower prices than similar items bearing the well-known labels you see
advertised nationally in magazines and newspapers and on TV screens, and which
are available in most food stores....
"Although the price disparity between private and national brands is sometimes
as great as those presented to customers in the Detroit A&P, most sponsored label
commodities are priced about one to three cents lower than comparable national
brand products. The chains claim they can sell their private brand items for less than
the national brands because they don't have to lay out big sums for advertising as
the big food producers do.'
121. See text at pp. 19-20 supra.
122. The so-called Quantity Limit Rule on rubber tires promulgated by the Federal
Trade Commission to impose a ceiling on permissible discounts in tire sales by the manu-
facturer, note 23 supra, is under attack partly by reason of its evident effect in compelling
"private brand" purchasers of tires to pay the same price as substantial purchasers of the
manufacturer's brand. AMOCO is assailing the Commission's rule as arbitrarily inflicting
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ceives no truly discriminatory favors; for the initial advantageous price quota-
tion from the manufacturer is offset by the distributor's expenditures in pro-
moting his private brand. But the price differential in either event-unless dis-
proportionately exceeding the consumer preference margin for the manufac-
turer's brand 123-- bestows no net advantage on the unbranded distributor. For
the branded distributor who nominally pays more acquires not only the product
but in addition the benefits of a manufacturer's brand that is worth money as a
pre-selling symbol.
1 2 4
On the contrary, it is a uniform price between a manufacturer's unbranded
and branded product that would be discriminatory-against the distributor
of the unbranded version who in terms of market realities purchases a much
less valuable item. Nominal price equality here would affirmatively perpetrate
economic discrimination and thereby defeat the objectives of antitrust.1 25 Yet
this is the import of a "like grade and quality" test oblivious to distinctions in
economic discrimination on private brand buyers, and the pending decision of the court of
appeals may resolve this issue in passing on the lower court's summary judgment invalidat-
ing the rule. B. F. Goodrich Co. v. FTC, 134 F. Supp. 39 (D.D.C. 1955).
123. This was the Federal Trade Commission's view in the Goodyear case. See text at
pp. 5-6, 19 supra. Cf. Adelman, The Consistency of the Robinson-Patman Act, 6 STAN. L.
REv. 3,9-10 (1953).
124. A recent district court decision invalidating "Fair Trade" legislation thus analyzed
the value added by the brand to the dealer's product:
"The price he paid was established because the article bore a certain label or trade-
mark. Had it not been for the label he would not have been required to pay such a
price. The label caused him to buy and the label assists him in selling. The value
of the item is thus enhanced by reason of the label indicating that it is an established
and nationally advertised commodity. If the label were removed the price to him
would be reduced proportionately.... To use an illustration, we may say a man
buys a Buick automobile. He pays more for it because it bears the label Buick, an
established nationally and internationally known piece of machinery. He sells the
car for a greater price because it bears the label Buick.... If it were made by Buick
but did not carry with it a labeled evidence of that fact, it would not have cost him
so much nor could he have sold it for so much."
Sunbeam Corp. v. Richardson, 1956 CCH TRADE RE. RE'. (1956 Trade Cas.) 1 68407, at
71744-45 (W.D. Ky. July 16, 1956).
125. According to the economic analysis of the Attorney General's Committee Report,
"Price discrimination, in the economic sense, occurs whenever and to the extent that there
are price differences for the same product or service sold by a single seller, and not
accounted for by cost differences or by changes in the level of demand; or when two or
more buyers of the same goods and services are charged the same price despite differences
in the cost of serving them." (Emphasis added.) ArTy GEN. REP. 333. Cf. Adelman, Price
Discrimination As Treated in the Attorney General's Report, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 222, 223
(1955) ; Adelman, The Consistency of the Robinson-Patman Act, 6 STAN. L. REV. 3, 4-5
(1953).
The Supreme Court in upholding milk price control legislation providing for a differen-
tial between nationally advertised brands and lesser known products has similarly stressed
that competition on equal terms could prevail only if the less advertised though physically
identical product were sold at a lower price so as to offset the consumer appeal of the highly
advertised brand. Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 251., 261-63 (1936).
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brand, and the prevailing strict doctrines of competitive "injury" coupled with
the futilities of cost justification.
Impediments to Product Innovation
Comparably, current legal doctrines can frustrate the dynamics of product
innovation and thereby deprive the economy of the fruits of a creative form of
competition.
In markets attuned to the consuming public, product differentiation is a rich
ingredient of economic progress.126 Whereas in the production and sale of
standardized staples, such as cement, salt, or sugar, price and delivery terms
are the focal attraction to the industrial buyer, the "merchandising" of con-
sumer-oriented goods must display additional and multifold appeals. In cater-
ing to the needs of specialized segments of the potential market, products per-
forming basically identical functions will thus become differentiated in proper-
ties and components. For example, in purchasing the "flexible packaging ma-
terials" in the classic market delineated by the Supreme Court's DuPont
decision, the commercial buyer may choose cellophane or any one of a dozen
other differentiated products with varied attributes including printability,
clarity, tear strength, and wrapping machine running qualities., 27 The motorist
can increasingly select from major refiners' gasolines that feature diverse octane
increases and special additives. 28 Manufacturers recognize that the purchase of
goods can spring from social as well as economic motivations: automobiles serve
as vehicles not only for transportation but for the advancement of prestige and
status-and GM profits from designing and differentiating its product line to
suit.' 2 9 In pursuit of the housewife's fancy, manufacturers must remain alert to
capture each fleeting yen: Tide makes clothes cleaner, Cheer gets them whiter.
126. For highly perceptive analysis, see Heflebower, Some Observations on Industrial
Prices, 27 J. Bus. U. Ci. 187, 190-91, 193 (1954) ; Heflebower, Industrial Pricing-In-
stitutional Practices Versus Abstract Models, 44 Am. EcoN. REv. 121 (Supp. 1954). See
also ATT'Y GEN. REP. 330-31 (1955) ; Alderson, Tire Effects of Price Controls on Non-
Price Competition, 4 LAW & CoNEP. PROB. 356 (1937) ; Till, The Fiction of the Quoted
Price, id. at 363 ; and sources cited note 132 infra.
127. See United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours Co., 351. U.S. 377, 411 (1956). The
story in aluminum and rubber tires is comparable. KAPLAN, BIG ENTERPRISE IN A COM-
PETITr SYsM 95-103 (1954).
128. Standard of New Jersey, Continental, and Sun Oil may have launched a trend
by supplanting the traditional two-grade marketing of gasoline with multi-grade distribu-
tion featuring new "super premium" high-octane blends. E.g., The $300,000,000 Question:
How Many Grades of Gasoline?, National Petroleum News, June 1956, p. 92; Wall Street
Journal, July 11, 1956, p. 14, col. 5.
129. GM's strategy has now been adapted to the resourceful marketing of men's hats.
As disclosed in an interview, the new chief executive of the Hat Corporation of America
contemplates the scene thus:
"'We have three divisions-Cavanagh, Knox, and Dobbs. Since I became presi-
dent and principal owner of the Hat Corporation last year, I've tried to pattern our
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and Oxydol leaves them "detergent-clean and bleach-white"-so wherever she
turns, Procter & Gamble is there.130
The resulting multiplication of differentiated products in response to some
facet of demand is not only profitable from the resourceful manufacturer's
standpoint.131 It furthers this fundamental goal of economic policy: an era of
abundance endowing the consumer with an ever-widening range of choice.
Moreover, the process of product differentiation may be a dynamic stimulus
to the vigor of competition. 32 In some sectors of the economy, price moves
operation after General Motors. Cavanagh is our Cadillac division, Knox our Olds-
mobile division, and Dobbs our Buick division.!
"'What about Champ?' we asked.
"'Champ will become our Chevrolet division,' Mr. Salesky replied....
"'Champ hats are mass hats. Hat Corporation hats are class hats.'"
The Talk of the Town, The New Yorker, Sept. 15, 1956, p. 33.
130. P. & G.'s theory is that "no one brand of detergent or shampoo will satisfy every
housewife, and that the best way to increase the company's share of a particular market
may be to launch a second or a third brand. The nexv brand may differ only slightly in
performance from the old one, but it must have some distinctive characteristic that can be
dramatized by the copy writers .... Thus, whichever way the housewife turns in her search
for the perfect detergent, P. & G. has something to offer her." Klaw, Winner and Still
Champion: P. & G., Fortune, March 1956, pp. 104, 105.
131. Significantly, both GM and Procter & Gamble are far ahead of the pack in their
respective industries.
132. Progressive economic theory has tempered the previous puritanical attitude toward
product differentiation as an insidious instrument of extending a producer's preserve for
"monopolistic' exploitation. Compare CHAmBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISfC COM-
PETITION (5th ed. 1946) as expounded in Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest:
Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1170 (1948), with Heflebower,
Some Observations on Industrial Prices, 27 J. Bus. U. Cm. 187, 190-91, 193 (1954), Hefle-
bower, Industrial Pricing-Institutional Practices Versuis Abstract Models, 44 Am. EcoN.
RLV. 121 (Supp. 1954), and KAPLAN, BIG ENTERPRISE IN A COMPETITIVE SYSTE C. V
(1954).
In the Attorney General's Committee Report, such economic sages as Morris A. Adel-
man, J. M. Clark, Clare E. Griffin, Eugene V. Rostow, Sumner H. Slichter, and George J.
Stigler subscribed to this more supple formulation:
"The effect of product differentiation depends on the market setting in which it
is placed. Extreme product differentiation, by tending to insulate the demand for
one product against that for rival products, may allow real positions of monopoly
to develop. Relatively mild differentiation of products within a market otherwise
effectively competitive, however, may be a factor favorable to the intensiveness of
competition, including price competition and competition in quality. This will tend
to be most forcibly the case if the product differentiation reflects product rivalry,
that is, product improvement, rather than mere heterogeneity of closely similar
products. For product differentiation, especially if it constitutes or embodies a
genuine innovation, may be a means whereby the seller can take advantage of the
time interval the market allows within which he can expect to gain from a com-
petitive move. Particularly if the situation is such as to justify uncertainty as to
the speed and completeness with which rivals will counter the initial move, such a
move, in the form of product differentiation, may contribute to the competitiveness
of market behavior."
A'Yv GEN. REP. 330-31. See note 133 infra.
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alone are futile gambits i n commercial rivalry. 133 For example, consumers may
believe that there really is little difference between the cleansing powers of one
make of soap over another. Consequently, one manufacturer's price reduction
for his soap may tempt a wary consumer and swing sales away from rival
makers of toiletries. But for the firm this may not be the prudent course, after
all. Word of the lower price for A's soap quickly spreads when posted on every
drugstore shelf, and before very long B and C must meet the reduction or take
heavy losses. Yet the new lower price level established after everyone's reduc-
tion benefits none of them-and they know it. A drop of, say, 20 per cent from
existing overall price levels for soap cannot help hurting all toiletry makers,
since it will hardly set off epidemics of public hygiene sufficient to lift total soap
sales by anywhere near 20 per cent.134 Price being a boomerang, the moral is
obvious: no maker of soap is eager to initiate a reduction from which he can-
not possibly hope to profit for long.
To crash such a pricing impasse, product differentiation can mobilize
the forces of competitive innovation. Price factors aside, a dynamic manufac-
turer can out-maneuver rivals to fatten his share of the market by actually
improving his product in quality. By adding deodorants to soap, fluorides or
even chlorophyll to toothpaste, an imaginative and aggressive manufacturer can
fox the competition-backed by the assurance that his innovation will confer a
profitable edge which, though doubtless temporary, lasts much longer than the
interval between a price cut and his rivals' inevitable matching response. 13
This scent for a competitive sneakthrough stimulates endless proliferation from
133. The "oligopoly" model of economics is constructed and manipulated in FELLNER,
CoMPETiTIoN AMONG THE FEw (1949). Indeed, more generous recognition of product
differentiation, as other forms of sublimated price competition, may be essential to rescue
oligopoly theory from a sterile dogmatism that must be refuted daily by the actual behavior
of industrial markets. In the words of Judge Jerome Frank, "monopoly-phobia, like most
phobias, is both a symptom and a cause of a neurotic tendency which, in refusing bravely
to face facts, cannot yield intelligent guidance." Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d
34, 42 (2d Cir. 1945) (concurring opinion). See also id. at 41; Eastern Wine Corp. v.
Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 958-59 (2d Cir. 1943) ; National Fruit Product Co.
v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499, 506-07 (D. Mass. 1942).
134. In economists' jargon, demand is "inelastic," i.e., the customer is relatively
apathetic to movements in price. E.g., NELSON & KEIM, PRICE BEHAVIOR AND BUSINESS
POLICY 35-36 (TNEC Monograph 1, 1940).
135. "Wherever, and to the degree that, 'demand orientation' is feasible, the product
is a potential variable and possibly more changeable than is the price for the item
already being made.
"In such cases-and they are very numerous-the adaptation of product may
undermine noncompetitive performance. Such a maneuver is almost impossible to
control, even with the power of government, as was learned under both NRA and
OPA. It makes the machinery industry inherently competitive and prolonged price-
quota agreement untenable for shoes or, indeed, for most consumer goods, exclusive
of such items as salt, sugar, or flour."
Heflebower, Some Observations on Industrial Prices, 27 J. Bus. U. CHI. 187, 190 (1954).
Cf. Klaw, How Armour Cleaned Up With Dial, Fortune, Nov. 1955, p. 129.
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the basic product: the extra "staying" bean in Maxwell House quantity-pack
coffee for the restaurant trade; the pre-cooking and packaging of Unox ham
as "Canadian Bacon"; or the spiking of gasoline with TCP. In some cases,
moreover, the product so enhanced may command a higher price than its lag-
ging rivals, thus shaking rigidified pricing relationships, fomenting uncertainty
all around as to the next price or product move, and opening fresh incentives
and opportunity for competitive maneuvering.
To the extent such innovation represents genuine product improvement
rather than gimmicks-and there is virtue in combatting body odor, tooth decay,
or engine knock-the economy benefits from a catalyzed rivalry through differ-
entiations channeled into constructive forms.'3 6
Yet whether conceived as a response to existing consumer demands or as a
competitive gambit, such product differentiation encounters current Robinson-
Patman doctrine. If the volume of traffic warrants, a manufacturer of differen-
tiated products may permanently maintain separate distributive organizations
dedicated to the marketing of one featured product, thereby reaping the re-
wards of single-minded sales devotion as well as wholesome intra-family rival-
ry.137 On a less formal basis, the manufacturer may wish to exploit his innova-
tion by recruiting a new and specialized corps of distributors with a marketing
mission, while retaining his older established middlemen for sales of the con-
ventional product line.' 38 Most flexibly, he might first want to probe the mar-
ket's reaction to his product variation, through the sensitive feelers of distribu-
tors selected as most suitable for such promotional reconnaissance. 3 9
In all cases, Robinson-Patman comes into play. The several variations will
doubtless be distributed at differential prices, for any price identity would neu-
tralize or blunt their consumer appeal by compromising their promotional dis-
tinctions. Such product variations, moreover, will rarely revolutionize the basic
function of the prototype product. The consequent "functional interchange-
136. To be sure, not all product differentiation is an economic boon. Spurious brand
variations, propagated by sponsors' subsidization of the tawdry japes of TV jokesters or
their financing of jackpots for moronic charades, contribute no product improvement yet
debase public tastes. For a thoughtful expos6 of the shabby aspects of product differen-
tiation once prevalent, see Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection
of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1167-84 (1948). That scathing indictment, however,
exempts fashions, improvements in quality or service, and other manifestations of non-price
competition which "at least offer ponderable utilities." Id. at 1179 n.61.
Corroborating Brown's dour thesis is the fabulous halitosis saga of the twenties, as re-
told in a millionaire's sparkling and uninhibited confession. Lambert, How I Sold Listerine,
Fortune, Sept. 1956, p. 111.
137. E.g., the General Motors distribution system which enfranchises separate distrib-
utors for the products of the several GM divisions. In the hat business, note 129 supra,
this strategy means "We would no more think of having the same dealers for Champ and
Cavanagh than G.M. would think of having the same dealers for Cadillacs and Chevrolets.
XWe'll sell Champs to Gimbel's, but we wouldn't dare sell them to Saks Fifth Avenue."
The Talk of the Town, The New Yorker, Sept. 15, 1956, p. 34.
139. Cf. the General Foods situation, text at pp. 13-14, 24-25 supra.
139. Cf. the Atalanta Trading situation, text at pp. 14-15, 24-25 supra.
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ability" among the several product variants would hence satisfy the predomi-
nant current conceptions of the "like grade and quality" test; and the differen-
tials in their pricing among rival distributors would encounter the virtually
automatic inference of competitive "injury" subject only to the dubious possi-
bilities of cost justification.
In addition to the resulting prohibition on differential pricing in their dis-
tribution, the evolving duties under the "payments" and "services" provisions
might thwart the seller's promotional or marketing strategy. Beamed at typical
market settings, the logical radiations from the Commission's rulings are jolt-
ing. Any supplier marketing both branded and unbranded tires or gasoline, for
example, might become obligated to offer equivalent advertising and promotion-
al benefits of whatever sort to his branded and unbranded distributors alike.140
And if a diversified manufacturer's cars are of "like grade and quality" irre-
spective of brand or design because "functionally interchangeable," all distrib-
utors of one make would rate promotional assistance comparable to that en-
joyed by competing distributors of every other type. Indeed, the rationale of
General Foods can collapse a strategy of multi-channel distribution by guaran-
teeing access to any product variation by every rival distributor rather than
only those the producer wishes to enfranchise.
As a result, the Robinson-Patman Act as presently construed can stultify
that product differentiation which widens consumer choice and supplies a dy-
namic competitive factor enriching the economy.
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
To remove existing legal barriers to competitive product differentiation,
several reforms are feasible--short of repeal or revision of the act itself. Owing
to the improbability of legislative modification of Robinson-Patman-b8te noire
of economics, 141 yet sacred cow of politics ' 4 2-interpretive reappraisals of
140. E.g., AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLMiS UNDER THE RoB-
INSON-PATMAN ACT 119-20 (rev. ed. 1953) ; FELDMAN & ZORN, ADVERTISING AND PROMO-
TIONAL ALLOWANCES 139-41 (1948) ; see United States Rubber Co., 28 F.T.C. 1489, 1502-
03 (1939).
141. The Robinson-Patman Act has been characterized as anticompetitive and anti-
thetical to overall antitrust policy, either in basic conception or specific application, by vir-
tually every economist or market analyst of academic repute-establishing a common
scholarly consensus that transcends political or philosophic persuasion.
The analysis of Antitrust Policy in Distribution in the Attorney General's Report,
stressed the conspicuous "collisions between the Robinson-Patman Act and the philosophy
underlying the Sherman and Clayton Acts," and proposed a series of interpretive reforms
designed to accommodate the Robinson-Patman Act to these broader antitrust objectives.
ATr'" GEN. REP. 131, & c. IV passim. Subscribing to the fundamentals of this approach
were the following academic Committee members: Morris A. Adelman, J. M. Clark, Ewald
T. Grether, Clare E. Griffin, Milton Handler, Alfred E. Kahn, James A. RahI, Eugene V.
Rostow, Sumner H. Slichter and George J. Stigler.
For additional critique by scholarly observers, see COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS,
THIRD ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 15 (1948) ; Adelman, The Consistency of the
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existing statutory provisions offer the sole potential for relief. Such reassess-
ment is encouraged by the recent mandate of the Supreme Court in the Auto-
matic Canteen case. In order to restrain Robinson-Patman enforcement from
Robinson-Patman Act, 6 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1953) ; Adelman, Effective Competition and
the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1289, 1334 (1948) ; Adelman, Integration and Anti-
trust Policy, 63 HARv. L. REv. 27, 60 (1949) ; Adelman, Integration and the Outlook for
the Future, CCH ANTITRUST LAW SYmPosIum 135, 138 (1951); R. W. Austin, The
Robinson-Patman Act-Is It In The Public Interest?, ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST
LAW PROCEEDINGS 92 (Sept. 1952) ; A. R. Burns, The Effectiveness of the Federal Anti-
trust Laws: A Symposium, 39 Am. EcoN. REv. 689, 695 (1949) ; A. R. Burns, The Anti-
trust Laws and the Regulation of Price Competition, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 301. (1937) ;
J. D. Clark, Statement in Hearings Before the Subcommittee on a Study of Monopoly
Power of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 14, pt. 1, at 107,
114 (1949) ; DIRLA-m & KAHN, FAIR COMPETITION : THE LAW AND ECoNOMICS OF ANTI-
TRUST POLICY 218-20, 243-45, 248-49, 254 (1954) ; C. D. EDWARDS: MAINTAINING COM-
PETITION 166-69 (1949); C. D. Edwards, The Struggle for Control of Distribution, 1 J.
MARKETING 212 (1937) ; C. E. Griffin, Statement in Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on a Study of the
Antitrust Laws, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 375 (1955) ; Hale & Hale, Monopoly in Motion:
Dynamic Economics in Antitrust Enforcement, 41 VA. L. REv. 431, 472-73 (1955) ; Hefle-
bower, Monopoly and Competition in Various Countries, in MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION
AND THEIR REGULATION 134-35 (Chamberlin ed. 1954) ; Heflebower, Statement in Hear-
ings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Conmittee on the
Judiciary on a Study of the Antitrust Laws, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 984 (1955) ; Learned &
Isaacs, The Robinson-Patmnan Law: Some Assumptions and Expectations, 15 HARv. Bus.
REv. 137 (1937) ; E. H. Levi, Analysis of Chapter IV of Attorney General's Committee
Report, ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW PROCEEDINGS 85 (Aug. 1955); Levi, The
Robinson-Patman Act-Is It In The Public Interest?, ABA SECTION or ANTITRUST LAW
PROCEEDINGS 60, 67 (Sept. 1952) ; E. S. Mason, The Current Status of the Monopoly Prob-
lent in the United States, 62 HARv. L. Rav. 1265 (1949) ; McNair, Marketing Functions
and Costs and the Robinson-Patman Act, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 334 (1937) ; Oppen-
heim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy,
50 MicH. L. Rav. 1139, 1198 (1952) ; RahI, Antitrust Policy in Distribution, 104 U. PA. L.
REV. 185 (1955) ; Rostow, Monopoly under the Sherman Act, Power or Purpose?, 43 ILL.
L. REv. 745, 749 (1949) ; Rostow, Market Organication and Stabilization Policy, in IN-
COME STABILIZATION FOR A DEVELOPING DmocRACY 498 (Millikan ed. 1953); Rostow,
Statement in Hearings of the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee
on Current Antitrust Problems, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1935 (1955).
The academic voices to the contrary are thin and almost apologetic. See dissenting
opinion of Louis B. Schwartz to the Report of the Attorney General's Committee, reprinted
in Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Sinall Business to Consider the Report
nf the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. 258, 269 (1955) ("The Robinson-Patman Act is an unhappy necessity. It tends
to encourage price rigidity inconsistent with Sherman Act objectives....") ; Walter Adams,
Statement in Hearings Before the House Snall Business Committee on Price Discrimi-
nation, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 615, 619 (1955) ("Before the Robinson-Patman Act is sacri-
ficed on the altar of hard competition, let us make certain that there are no better or more
worthy sacrificial lambs to be found elsewhere."). See also Statement of Vernon A. Mund,
id. at 639.
142. An eloquent testimonial to the act's political viability is the history of proposals
in the Eighty-fourth Congress to sharply curtail the "meeting competition" defense. S. 11
and H.R. 11, companion bills to secure "equality of opportunity," proposed to overturn the
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imposing "a price uniformity and rigidity in open conflict with the purposes of
other antitrust legislation," the Court there enunciated a duty to "reconcile such
interpretation" wherever feasible "with the broader antitrust policies that have
been laid down by Congress.' 43 Doctrinal reform to liberate product differen-
tiation can fasten on several provisions: (1) the content of the term "discrimi-
nation"; (2) the tests of competitive "injury"; (3) the scope of permissible
cost justification; and most effectively, (4) the jugular concept of "like grade
and quality."
The Content of "Discrimination"
The concept of "discrimination" is an unlikely vehicle for resolution of prod-
uct differentiation problems.
Since the act only applies when a person "discriminates in price" to
cause the proscribed competitive effects, the term "discriminate" might be
construed so as to exclude price differentials for genuinely differentiated prod-
Supreme Court's decision in the Standard Oil case, 340 U.S. 231 (1951), by making the
"meeting competition" defense unavailable whenever the challenged price differential poten-
tially lessened competition. These bills were vigorously opposed by the Justice Depart-
ment not only for nullifying § 2(b) of the statute, but also as incompatible with overall
antitrust policy. According to the Chief of the Antitrust Division, the Standard Oil ruling
"goes far to harmonize the Robinson-Patman Act with the basic tenor of antitrust policy,"
and passage of the bills "would move the price discrimination statute into irreconcilable
conflict with the Sherman Act." Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House
Judiciary Committee on Bills to Amend Sections 2 and 3 of the Clayton Act, 84th Cong.,
2d Sess. 177 (1956). But a rare parliamentary maneuver-a "discharge petition" signed
by a majority of House members-pried the legislation out of Representative Celler's re-
luctant Judiciary Committee, and it was passed by a vote of 393-3. See H.R. REP. No.
2202, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) ; 102 CONG. REc. 9023 (daily ed. June 11, 1956). While
the Federal Trade Commission by 3-2 vote abandoned its previous opposition, the Justice
Department stood fast in the ensuing Senate hearings. Hearings Before the Subcomnlittee
on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on Bills to Amend
Section 2 of the Clayton Act, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 225, 688-91 (1956). Nevertheless, the
bill was favorably reported, S. REP. No. 2817, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956), but could not
be brought to a Senate vote on the last day of the legislative session. 102 CONG. REc.
13876-77 (daily ed. July 28, 1956).
Although the "meeting competition" defense had succeeded but once in twenty years of
Robinson-Patman enforcement, Rep. Patman in pressing for passage proclaimed that due
to Standard Oil "the Captain Kidd's in business are having a field day" while "these in-
dependent merchants are screaming, and they have a right to scream." House Judiciary
Committee Hearings, supra at 243, 254. Chairman Celler of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee, conquered by Mr. Patman for the second time in twenty years, bitterly remarked:
"Who am I to pit my views against the very rich talent of the proponents represented by
the score of retail organizations who are directly affected by this bill ?" 102 CONG. REc.
9025 (daily ed. June 11, 1956).
143. 346 U.S. 61, 63, 74 (1953). Cf. the whittling of the."Fair Trade" exemptions to
the Sherman Act because the Court deemed itself "bound to construe them strictly, since
resale price maintenance is a privilege restrictive of a free economy." United States v.
McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 316 (1956).
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ucts. 44 Such a contention could draw on the oft-quoted explanation of the
Robinson-Patman bill by Representative Utterback to the House of Represen-
tatives just prior to its passage: "a discrimination is more than a mere differ-
ence. Underlying the meaning of the word is the idea that some relationship
exists between the parties to the discrimination which entitles them to equal
treatment, whereby the difference granted to one casts some burden or dis-
advantage upon the other."'14 5 By this reasoning, the term "discriminate" could
denote not any price differential but only an economically inequitable spread
in price. Price differentials among significantly differentiated products would
not be considered inequitable or prejudicial, for the respective customers had
not acquired a product of equal value in the market.
Such an analysis, however, must buck twenty years of precedent. Sev-
eral Supreme Court decisions, while not adjudicating this precise issue, have
recited price "discrimination" interchangeably with price differences in sales
among competing customers,'146 and the Cement Institute opinion actually went
beyond this situation to flatly define "discrimination in price" as "selling the
same kind of goods cheaper to one purchaser than to another."'1 47 A recent
exhaustive FTC analysis specifically addressed to the content of the term "dis-
crimination" is in accord.148 Yet the Supreme Court's 1953 Automatic Can-
teen decision quoted the Utterback statement, and acknowledged that "dis-
crimination" might mean either a price differential in sales between competitors
or only such a differential that "puts the unfavored competitor at a disadvan-
tage. ' ' 149 Furthermore, a fuzzy court of appeals opinion in 1955, without analysis
of the basis or import of its assertion nor reference to the contrary legal con-
sensus, disclaimed that a price differential among geographically disparate
customers was tantamount to a "discrimination."'1 0
But besides the preponderance of precedent,5 1 the prevailing legal equation
of price differences with discriminations merits retention as an indispensable
144. For text of § 2(a), see note 24 supra.
145. 80 CONG. REc. 9416 (1936).
146. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 340 U.S. 470, 473-74 (1952) ; FTC v. Morton Salt Co.,
334 U.S. 37, 45 & n.13 (1948) ; cf. FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 757 (1945).
147. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 721 (1948) ; cf. Moore v. Mead's Fine
Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 116-19 (1954) ; Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378, 379
(2d Cir. 1945).
148. Purex Corp., Ltd., FTC Dkt. 6008, at 4-7 (April 16, 1954), Initial Decision
adopted by FTC (Sept. 15, 1954).
149. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 70 n.10, 71 (1953).
150. Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356, 367-68 (9th Cir. 1955).
For other ambiguous implications that price differentials as such are not "discriminations"
unless quoted among competing customers, see General Shale Products Corp. v. Struck
Constr. Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 603 (W.D. Ky. 1941). Cf. PATMAN, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN
AcT 59 (1938).
151. See also AUSTIN, PRIcE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE
ROBINSON-PAT2IAN AcT 18-20 (rev. ed. 1953); cf. PATMAN, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN
AcT 24 (1938) : "The statement that it shall be unlawful to discriminate in price is of the
same effect as to say that it shall be unlawful to make a different price."
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rule of thumb. In the first place, any refinement of "discrimination" into a
legal term of art can hardly be restricted to the single problem of product dif-
ferentiation. If only "inequitable" price differentials were equivalent to statu-
tory "discrimination," not only differential pricing among differentiated prod-
ucts but all other economically rational price spreads might claim exemption-
viz., functional or quantity discounts. Inevitably every legal controversy over
any price difference would shift from the detailed governing provisions-"in-
jury," cost justification, "meeting competition," etc.--over into the "discrimi-
nation" concept for ad hoc resolution divorced from specifically pertinent statu-
tory text. In addition, a view of the statutory "discrimination" as something
more subtle than a simple differential might logically require an obverse appli-
cation: perceiving statutory discriminations from "inequitable" nominal price
uniformity where no differentials exist. Whatever the inherent virtues in such
an economically sophisticated conception, it would project the act into hitherto
exempt areas of pricing. 15 2 What is more, anything more complex than a dis-
parity in quoted price could confound all future identification of the pricing
subject to Robinson-Patman controls by scrapping a simple and workable legal
starting point.
1 53
Since a more artful interpretation of the "discrimination" phrase in the act
might open the floodgates to new tides of confusion, the prevailing doctrine
is not likely to be revised favorably to product differentiation programs.
The Tests of Competitive "Injury"
Realistic reinterpretation of the criteria of competitive "injury" provides a
more fruitful though incomplete resolution of the product differentiation
dilemma.
A perceptive inquiry into the link between a challenged price differential and
the requisite competitive "injury" could go far in protecting product differen-
152. The Robinson-Patman Act has from the outset been interpreted to exempt all
uniform pricing on the part of the seller, whether discriminatory in any economic sense
or not. See, e.g., Bird & Son, Inc., 25 F.T.C. 548 (1937) ; cf. FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co.,
324 U.S. 746, 757 (1945).
153. Some years ago, dicta in the Supreme Court's Cement Institute opinion appeared
to sanction a Robinson-Patman interpretation measuring prices not by comparing quota-
tions among customers, but by discerning discriminations from any difference in the seller's
net return after the deduction of all freight charges incorporated in the quoted price. 333
U.S. 683, 722-25 (1948). This "mill-net" theory jeopardized all delivered pricing-whether
computed by "basing points," zones, or any other mechanism-as inherently discriminatory
because it necessarily resulted in differing net returns for the seller depending on the trans-
portation costs in serving his several customers. The "mill-net" theory was finally buried
by the Federal Trade Commission in National Lead Co., 49 F.T.C. 791, 881-82 (1953),
which held that the Robinson-Patman Act was brought into play only by "differences in
actual prices at which the respondents' products are sold." (Emphasis added.) Any novel
reinterpretations of the statutory concept of "price" would inevitably revive the "delivered
pricing" controversy which sowed legal confusion and animated Congressional action over




tiation. True, the 1936 Robinson-Patman revisions of the Clayton Act sharp-
ened the tests of detriment to competition so as to nip discriminations carrying
a potential of lesser magnitude than the previously requisite debilitation of an
entire "line of commerce." However, the amendments did not purport to super-
sede the analytic techniques for tracing competitive detriment exemplified in
the FTC's Goodyear ruling. Inimical competitive effects stemming from Good-
year's private brand differential in favor of Sears were adjudged only after
comparative analysis of the profit margins of the affected customers, and after
taking account of consumer preferences for the nationally advertised Goodyear
brand tire. In this way, the price differentials were related to competitive im-
pairment in tire distribution only in light of corollary factors illuminating their
market impact. As appropriate today as at the time of Goodyear, a comparably
discerning analysis of differentials among differentiated products could relieve
current threats of per se illegality.
To this end, the statutory standard of "competitive" injury should be con-
strued to accord due recognition to the consumer preferences operative in the
pricing of differentiated goods. Cognizant of the pricing hazards among un-
branded and nationally advertised versions of a seller's product, the Report of
the Attorney General's National Connittee to Study the Antitrust Laws re-
cently recommended that "whenever a seller's price differentials to intermedi-
ate distributors as between branded and unbranded forms of a physically iden-
tical product reflect no more than the spread between the prices the public will
pay for one as against the other, no 'injury' to competition should reasonably
be found. For such a price differential creates no competitive advantage for
the recipient of the cheaper unbranded product; rather, it represents merely a
rough equivalent of the benefit by way of the seller's national advertising and
promotion which the purchaser of the more expensive branded product en-
joys."1'- 4 Under a logical extension of this perceptive analysis-suitable for all
forms of product differentiation--only the excess of the producer's price differ-
ential over the margin of consumer preferences between the products in ques-
tion should as a matter of law be held capable of impairing competition. In
terms of the statute, only that excess could have the causal "effect of" com-
petitive "injury"-by whatever tests "injury" is gauged. 155 Administered in
154. ATT'y GENT. REP. 159 (1955).
155. No need would exist for resolving the perennial controversy over the act's appli-
cation to injury to competition or to competitors. See id. at 163-65. The Committee recom-
mended that "analysis of the statutory 'injury' center on the vigor of competition in the
market rather than hardship to individual businessmen." Id. at 164. That view accords with
Purex Corp., Ltd., FTC Dkt. 6003, at 11, 13-14 (April 16, 1954), Initial Decision adopted
by FTC (Sept. 15, 1954). The Commission, notwithstanding its virtually automatic in-
ferences of competitive "injury" from price differentials on the customer level (see text at
pp. 18-20 supra), has taken a more tolerant attitude toward differentials charged with
"injuring" competition among the seller's own competitors. In addition to the Purex de-
cision, see also The Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., FTC Dkt. 6232 (June 28, 1956) ; General
Foods Corp., FTC Dkt. 5675 (April 27, 1954). Indeed, the Commission on the authority
of Yale & Towne recently dismissed five companion proceedings challenging discounts by
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this fashion, the "injury" provision would interdict only those disproportionate
and excessive differentials lacking correspondence with the pricing relation-
ships among differentiated goods in ultimate consumer markets.'5 6
Such an analytic approach to statutory "injury," however sound, faces formi-
dable obstacles in FTC policy. The proposed analysis would subtract from the
price differential the amount representing the value of the "extra," and then
test whether the remainder, if any, can wreak competitive harm. Its underlying
premise is the truth that a distributor acquiring a product plus promotion-or
other valuable differentiating factor-receives more and hence must pay more
than another distributor who pays less but gets less. But the Commission has
decried that economic axiom in the analogous Robinson-Patman context of
"functional" pricing. In the classic Standard Oil case, the FTC condemned a
refiner's lower price to a distributor purchasing bulk gasoline-and performing
his own storage and redelivery to his service station pumps-in comparison
with dealers paying more for gasoline plus the bulk storage and delivery pro-
vided by the refiner.' 57 After some contrary indications in the Doubleday
case,158 that theory was reaffirmed in this year's General Foods decision. 159 In
sellers of industrial trucks that allegedly impaired competition in the sellers' own line of
business. Clark Equipment Co., FTC Dkt. 6347 (July 31, 1956) ; Elwell Parker Elec. Co.,
FTC Dkt. 6329 (July 31, 1956) ; Hyster Co., FTC Dkt. 6330 (July 31, 1956) ; Lewis
Shepard Co., FTC Dkt. 6340 (July 31, 1956) ; Otis Elevator Co., FTC Dkt. 6350 (July
31, 1956). See also Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir.
1955). For a jaundiced view of some of the Commission's rulings in this area, see Comment,
The "New" Federal Trade Commission and the Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws, 65
YALE L.J. 34, 71-85 (1955).
156. Cf. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 22 F.T.C. 232 (1936), as analyzed by the Com-
mission. See text at pp. 5-6 supra.
157. 41 F.T.C. 263 (1945), modified, 43 F.T.C. 56 (1946), aff'd, 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir.
1949), rev'd, 340 U.S. 231 (1951), reissued with new findings, 49 F.T.C. 923 (1953), set
aside, 233 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. filed, 25 U.S.L. WEEx 3107 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1956)
(No. 465). For an excellent analysis of this phase of Standard Oil, see Note, Functional Dis-
counts under the Robinson-Patinan Act: The Standard Oil Litigation, 67 HAav. L. REv.
294, 303 (1953). See also AT'r'Y GEN. RE. 205-08 (1955) ; McGee, Price Discrimination
and Competitive Effects: The Standard Oil of Indiana Case, 23 U. Cal. L. REV. 398 (1956).
158. Doubleday & Co., FTC Dkt. 5897, at 5 (Aug. 31, 1955) indicated that inasmuch
as "integrated" or multi-function distributors relieved the supplier of many marketing tasks
which he otherwise might have to perform himself, such functions should "be recognized
and reimbursed." Where a distributor actually assumed such extra marketing functions,
"the law should not forbid his supplier from compensating him for such services," though
"the amount of the discount should be reasonably related to the expenses assumed by the
buyer." This and the other pertinent rulings are analyzed in Rowe, Borderland Issues in
Court and Commissim Cases under Sections 2 and 3 of the Clayton Act, ABA SECTION
oF ANTITRUST LAw PROcEEDINGS 60, 64-69 (April 1956).
159. As adopted by the Commission, the General Foods Initial Decision held that "a
seller cannot justify allowances to purchasers which, in fact, constitute payments to them
for doing their own work in the resale of goods purchased and owned by them." FTC Dkt.
6018, at 11 (March 2, 1955), adopted by FTC (Feb. 15, 1956). The Commission's General
Foods attitude was heralded in one phase of its Edelnann decision where it disapproved
any price reductions reflecting the recipients' performance of marketing functions which
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view of the FTC's adamant nonrecognition of "extra" marketing functions-
provided by the seller to higher-price buyers; or, conversely, performed by
lower-price customers themselves-only a basic reorientation in the Commis-
sion's conception of functional "integration" could tolerate the proposed analy-
sis of "injury."'' 10
On the other hand, courts have never adopted the Commission's nihilistic
attitudes toward multi-function marketing. The key judicial interpretations of
competitive "injury" did not concern price differentials between products dif-
ferentiated or embodying differing quanta of marketing functions, or did not
appraise such issues though latent in the facts. The famous Morton Salt case,
for example, involved quantity and volume discounts for identical Morton
"Blue Label" salt sold at the same delivered price basis to all customers. 161 And
while Standard Oil's adjudication on the administrative level condemned lower
prices to extra-function distributors as competitively "injurious," the two judi-
cial review phases of this legal marathon centered on other statutory issues-
although the Supreme Court indicated that no "injury" should ever be blamed
on a competitive reduction to customers who could get the same low price from
other sources anyway.1 2 Consequently, a more realistic analysis of competitive
"injury" in relation to differentiated products-while perhaps foredoomed on
the FTC level-may yet have its day before the courts.
1 3
But even judicial rationalization of the "injury" provision cannot wholly
absolve a program of product differentiation. Inasmuch as the promotional
"allowances" or "services" provisions as presently construed enact absolute
prohibitions regardless of "injury," the duty to comply with their indetermi-
nate proscriptions would persist. Reforms of the "injury" provision thus could
ease only the pricing risks, while accompanying promotional strategy would
remain subject to severe restraints in the "payments" and "services" provisions.
Cost Justification
The statutory cost justification offers scant potential for interpretive reform
benefiting programs of product differentiation. Although doctrinal uncertainty
"inured to the benefit" of themselves. E. Edelmann & Co., FTC Dkt. 5770, at 7-8 (May
10,1955).
160. The Commission's policy toward permissible pricing among multi-function dis-
tributors has been characterized as inflicting "a legal penalty on integration." Adelman,
The Consistency of the Robinson-Patinan Act, 6 STAN. L. REv. 3, 13 (1953). See also
Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition and Confuasion: Another Look at Robinson-Pat-
man, 60 YALE L.J. 929,945 (1951).
161. 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
162. See 340 U.S. 231, 250 (1951). Both times the issue focused on the legal sufficiency
of Standard's "meeting competition" defense which both the court of appeals and the Su-
preme Court assumed to be factually established. 173 F.2d 210, 213 (7th Cir. 1949), rev'd,
340 U.S. 231, 243 n.9 (1951) ; 233 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1956).
163. Such a reorientation could draw for support on the M11inneapolis-Honeywell de-
cision, which stressed the need for a "causal connection" between the challenged differen-
tial and the claimed "injury" and set aside an FTC "injury" finding owing to the absence
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and insistence on mathematical exactitude have been the twin enigmas foiling
past cost justifications, the range of feasible reform is narrow.
The nub of the problem is the tenuous and shifty nexus between prices and
costs in competitive markets. Whatever may be the custom among corner
grocers who quote prices by adding a set mark-up to their invoice costs, pric-
ing decisions of substantial firms under competitive conditions do not evolve
this way. Rather, industrial prices are coalesced from manifold considerations,
with cost only part of the panorama of the market where competitive and
strategic factors loom uppermost.16 4 To be sure, a secure monopolist may retain
plenary power to fix his prices on the basis of cost. But sellers exposed to nor-
mal competitive forces must quote prices responsive to the pressures of demand
and competition. Such prices are not determined by cost; indeed, prices-
which influence sales, hence production volume, which in turn governs the
efficiency of the firm's plant utilization-may determine the unit cost of the
output more directly than vice-versa. A cost justification tendered in a Robin-
son-Patman proceeding thus is ordinarily an ex post facto rationalization of
price differentials that result from the interplay of other factors. As an artful
portrayal of a missing link between cost and price, it is an enterprise at once
contrived and suspect.165
of the requisite causal relationship. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191
F.2d 786, 790-92 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952).
164. For a scholarly, incisive analysis of price-cost relationships in modern industrial
markets, see Heflebower, Full Costs, Cost Changes, and Prices, in BUsINEss CONCENTRA-
TION AND PRICE PoLIcY 361-92 (1955), and Comments by Coase, id. at 392, and Papan-
dreou, id. at 394. Consult also KNAUTH, BUSINESS PRACrIcEs, TRADE POSITION AND
COmpETITION (1956) ; DRAN, MANAGERIAL Ecoxomics 450-51 (1951) ; EDWARDS, MAIN-
TAIING COMirz'MTION 161-62 (1949).
165. For this reason, the underlying premise of the Robinson-Patman cost justification
has been scored as fallacious in conception. Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition and
Confusion: Another Look at Robinson-Patuman, 60 YALE L.J. 929, 964-65 (1951) ; Austin,
Let's Get Cost Pricing Out of Our Laws, Harv. Bus. Rev., May-June 1954, p. 67 (1954).
Actually, comparable criticism was directed at the statute as early as 1937. See Mc-
Nair, Marketing Functions and Costs and the Robinson-Patman Act, 4 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 334, 337 (1937) ("bad economics and impossible accounting") ; McLaughlin, The
Courts and the Robinson-Patinan Act: Possibilities of Strict Construction, 4 id. at 410,
415-16 ("utterly overwhelming and subversive of legitimate business practice") ; Hamil-
ton, Cost as a Standard for Price, 4 id. at 321, 333 ("to enthrone cost as the governor of
the bargaining process is to change the character of business enterprise.... The cost-price
provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act invite a hazardous attempt at police. In its ad-
ministration it seems destined to raise more questions than it settles.").
One of the most articulate critics of the basic concept of cost justification has been
Corwin D. Edwards, formerly Chief Economist of the FTC. See EDWARDS, MAINTAINING
COMPETITION 161 (1949) ("in selling to different customers, few costs are clearly segre-
gable, and the allocation of the rest is determined by policy decisions which masquerade as
mere accounting procedures") ; Comnents and Discussion, CCH ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
Symlposlu 57, 60 (1947) ("the allocation of joint cost ... is a matter of business policy,
not a matter of fact .... [W] e are in danger of erecting the FTC into a sort of an ortho-
dox cost accounting faculty.") ; The Struggle for Control of Distribution, 1 J. MARKETING
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In addition, the allocation of costs among jointly produced products is in-
herently indeterminate and uncertain. 166 Any program of product differen-
tiation necessarily spreads the costs of manufacture and distribution over the
several items in the product line. Cost allocations requiring "breakdowns" of
these joint manufacturing and distribution costs to justify the price of individ-
ual product components iust entail subjective and arbitrary judgments that
transcend legal formulation. The certitude of charts and columns of numbers
obscures the truth that cost accounting can develop no universally valid prin-
ciple of allocations for explaining price differentials among two or more jointly
manufactured and marketed products. For this reason, there is no legal safety
in a prefabricated cost justification through a firm's "in-built" system of honest-
ly maintained daily business records.
167
The Report submitted this February by the Federal Trade Commission's
Advisory Committee on Cost Justification appointed in 1953 corroborates this
inescapable futility. 6 s The Committee observed that elaborate cost data radiate
"an aura of precision that is not warranted" because "cost differences at best
include elements of opinion and approximation," and acknowledged that many
factors "preclude the possibility of developing uniform methods and procedures
212, 216 (1937) ("the pursuit of discrimination into the labyrinths of cost accounting will
produce a clash of accounting orthodoxies reminiscent of the theological disputes of the
early churchmen.").
That 1937 prophecy came to pass in a treble damage case in 1951. To "justify" its
quantity discount system, American Can Co. presented comprehensive cost studies approved
as "a well conceived, carefully operated and very well organized system" by a distinguished
authority on Robinson-Patman accounting matters, Assistant Dean of the University of
Michigan's School of Business Administration and later Chairman of the FTC Advisory
Committee on Cost Justification. In refutation, a prominent Robinson-Patman CPA who
for seventeen years had functioned in this capacity for the FTC berated the cost study on
behalf of the plaintiff, avowing he had seen "none as crazy as this." American Can Co. v.
Russellville Canning Co., 191. F.2d 38, 51-52 (8th Cir. 1951).
166. See sources cited note 165 supra.
167. The Supreme Court has pointedly remarked that a Robinson-Patman cost defense
must develop data which "apparently cannot be obtained from ordinary business records.
... It is not a question of obtaining information in the seller's hands. It is a matter of
studying the seller's business afresh." Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 68-69
(1953). Cf. Taggart, Cost Justification Under the Robin-son-Patmnm Act, J. Accountancy,
June 1956, pp. 52, 54: "Few laymen (in the accounting sense) are so unsophisticated as to
believe that an economically feasible record-keeping system can be devised which would
give an immediate answer to every Robinson-Patman problem. The experience of Ameri-
can Can Company, which actually carried out an ambitious project of this sort for nearly
five years, does little to encourage emulation."
168. ADVIsORY COMMITTEE ON COST JUSTIFICATION, REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE
CommissioN (1956) (hereinafter cited as COST JUsTIFICATION REP.). The Committee,
comprising distinguished accountants versed in Robinson-Patman matters, was conceived
in hopes of ascertaining standards of "costing" suitable for adoption by the FTC as guides
to business firms wishing to comply with the act and willing "to organize their cost records
accordingly." FTC, Press Release, Nov. 30, 1953. No official action has been taken on the
Committee's recommendations to date.
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of cost accounting for Robinson-Patman Act purposes."'1 9 Accordingly, the
Committee proposed that the FTC "refrain as far as possible from adopting
specific rules of accounting analysis exclusive of others," and that it instead
"encourage the application of ingenuity and imagination in this complex
area." 170 The salient feature of the Report is in its focus on FTC forbearance
rather than substantive clarification as the key to reform. However constructive
the procedural improvements and liberalization of administrative attitudes also
recommended,171 they highlight the lack of logic and rationality in cost justifi-
cation. "Ingenuity and imagination," while a wholesome departure from ac-
counting dogmatism, cannot foster predictability or facilitate compliance. With
criteria of acceptability defying formulation, cost justification mocks ordinary
legal processes and can in reality aim only at informal accommodations between
opposing accountants. To lawyers a cost justification will partake of an actu-
arial minuet if not a mutual confidence game.
172
169. CosT JuSTIFIcATION REP. 6, 10. Actually, the Report has moved back once more
the boundaries of an ever-receding mirage. Rationalization of distribution cost allocation
was expected as a major by-product of the Robinson-Patman Act. In 1937 there was "a
great new stirring throughout business concerning methods of checking distribution costs."
George, Business and the Robinson-Patinan Act, 4 LAw & CONTEMP. Pnoa. 392, 401-02
(1937). In 1941, an FTC investigation of distribution cost procedures revealed "a dearth
of good case material" because "methods that are in use are undergoing change." Case
Studies in Distribution Cost Accounting for Manufacturing and Wholesaling, H.R. Doc.
No. 287, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1941). Ten years later distribution cost accounting was
found to be still in its "pioneering stage." Sawyer, Accounting and Statistical Proof in
Price Discrimination Cases, 36 IOwA L. REv. 244, 259-60 (1951). In 1956, twenty years
after Robinson-Patman, the Chairman of the FTC's Advisory Committee on Cost Justifi-
cation observed that its Report "does not purport to be the last word in this complex field.
Indeed, it is only a beginning." Taggart, Cost Justification Under the Robinson-Patinan
Act, J. Accountancy, June 1956, pp. 52,56.
170. COST JUSTIFICATION REP. 10.
171. Among the Report's recommendations are a more generous application of the
de minimis concept by the Commission when faced with only partially justified price dif-
ferentials; improved facilities for consultation by respondents with the FTC accounting
staff; freer exchange of information at the pre-trial stage of formal proceedings; and
centering of the inquiry on the underlying basis of challenged allocations rather than
numbers and petty detail. Id. at 5, 15, 17, 18.
In some contradiction of the Committee's conclusion that rules of universal applicability
are precluded by the large area of subjective discretion in cost allocations is its recom-
mendation for the appointment of an FTC Accounting Adviser to prepare "a continuous
series of accounting opinions interpreting the cost proviso" as "an authoritative guide to
industry and the accounting profession in this field." Id. at 16, 18. It might abort the very
"ingenuity and imagination in this complex area" espoused by the Report. See id. at 16.
What is more, it would inevitably complicate the already complex processes of the Com-
mission by introducing a sub-tribunal for accounting-a principle equally suitable to eco-
nomics, marketing, or any of a number of relevant factors in a price discrimination pro-
ceeding. Also, such an institution would create the legal incongruity of the statutory cost
justification being resolved in divergent ways before the FTC and courts who must adjudi-
cate the issue without benefit of Accounting Advisors.
172. See notes 165 supra, 173 infra.
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For a seller of differentiated products this legal outlook emerges: The cost
defense offers an expensive yet synthetic and chancy technique for vindicating
price differentials. Its contribution to counseling and logical forecasting of the
legality of prices is minimal. Rather, its practical utility will vary with extra-
legal considerations more than doctrinal developments. Greater administrative
flexibility, rooted in frank recognition of the inadequacies of cost as a standard
for price, can help once litigation is in the offing. But patience, perseverance,
prolific expenditures, and rapport with FTC officials-rather than legal prin-
ciple-will count for the most.173 And as in the case of the "injury" provision,
even successful cost justification can exonerate only the pricing aspects of a
program for product differentiation but cannot mitigate the promotional risks
deriving from the "payments" and "services" provisions.
The Concept of "Like Grade and Quality"
Due to the obstacles and limitations confronting all other avenues of doctrinal
reform, reappraisal of the unsettled "like grade and quality" provision promises
the most effective safeguard for the pricing as well as promotional aspects of
product differentiation.
To this end, a test of "fungibility"' 7 4 is proposed to supplant evolving "like
grade and quality" interpretations that expose programs of product differen-
tiation to legal jeopardy. Never definitively construed, "like grade and quality"
has drifted toward a theme of "functional interchangeability" that subjects
virtually all differentiated products to the act's restrictions. All automobiles,
gasolines, or soaps-howsoever differentiated in brand, design, or components-
fulfill a single "function" and are "functionally interchangeable." The hallmark
of "fungibility," on the other hand, is the merchant's commercial indifference
as between comparable yet not identical commodities of equal worth; it pre-
supposes that the business community would as lief take one product as an-
173. In the view of two sophisticated Robinson-Patman hands: "As things now stand,
the justification of different prices by cost differences is available only to the wealthy, the
resourceful, and the tireless. It requires a detailed, if not a surgical, functional analysis
of the seller's entire business. Even then the conflict of theory, methods, allocations, and
accounting conventions makes more for an intellectual chess game than for any reasonable
evaluation of whether the seller in good faith went beyond making 'due allowance.' "
Austern, Tabula in Naufraqio-Administrative Style, Some Observations on the Robinson-
Patnon Act, 1953 CCH ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM 105, 115 (1953). Cost justification
"has proven to be extremely difficult, expensive, and unreliable." Taggart, Cost .rustifi-
cation Under the Robinson-Patnmn Act, J. Accountancy, June 1956, p. 52.
174. The "fungibility" concept traces to Mr. Justice Clark's majority opinion in Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 613 (1953), which viewed New
Orleans morning and evening newspaper readers as "fungible customer potential" for ad-
vertisers, and hence includible within a single antitrust "market." The government in the
recent DuPont Cellophane case illogically and unsuccessfully pressed that concept upon
the Supreme Court as also marking the onter boundaries of the relevant market in monopo-
lization cases. Brief for the United States, pp. 67-77, United States v. E. I. duPont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
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other for the sante money. Analogous goods would be deemed "fungible" and
hence of "like grade and quality" only if they normally sold in the market at
the same "going price."'175 Since "fungibility" would thus restrict Robinson-
Patman coverage to discriminatory practices in the marketing of commerciallv
"interchangeable" products, the act would continue to interdict genuine dis-
criminations against customers who must pay more for goods that others nor-
mally buy for less-while ceasing to menace normal price variations and pro-
motional programs in a seller's differentiated product line.
In practical application, the "fungibility" test would facilitate adjudication
of the "like grade and quality" issue as to promotionally as well as physically
differentiated goods. To illustrate: Historically a refiner's straight-run gasoline
would have been "fungible" with cracked gasoline, for, as the Supreme Court
observed in 1930, "the two are either mixed or sold interchangeably.' u7 6 On
the other hand, gasolines registering "super-premium" octane ratings or featur-
ing special chemical additives are not "fungible" with the ordinary blend because
they normally command higher prices in the market. Nor are nationally adver-
tised and promoted gasolines "fungible" with unbranded gas, for their divergent
consumer acceptance is reflected in an established price spread. 77 However,
nominal brand distinctions uncharged with the seller's promotional appeal do
not touch "fungibility," since an unknown brand would not govern commercial
choice.178 As for distinctions in size or design, the custom of the trade might
provide the clue. If the dimension of cans is of the commercial essence to can-
175. For example, section 76 of the Uniform Sales Act defines fungible goods as "goods
of which any unit is from its nature or by mercantile usage treated as the equivalent of
any other unit.'
A focus on the business comcmnity rather than the individual businessman would adapt
the strict concepts of commercial law to the requirements of a trade regulation statute. The
law merchant is necessarily concerned with the satisfaction of the individual who purchases
and must pay for goods needed in his business, and must rely on the delivery of precisely
what he ordered. To the buyer who is under contract to resell pursuant to specifications
or who must otherwise fill an exact need, minor differences will matter which are incon-
sequential to the trade at large. Such conceptual strictness, while doubtless appropriate
to the sphere of private commercial intercourse in protecting legitimate contractual expec-
tations, would prove much too refined for purposes of a trade regulation statute that must
deal with commercial generalities in declaring a broad public policy ranging over dynamic
markets. The looser test here proposed would discount minor divergences at which the
law merchant might balk.
176. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 176 (1931) ; cf. Blue Bell Co.
v. Frontier Refining Co., 213 F2d 354, 356-57 (10th Cir. 1954).
177. The typical price differential between a major refiner's "regular" and "premium"
grade gasoline was found to average 23/-3 cents per gallon. CASSADY, PRICE MAKING
AND PRICE BEHAVIOR IN THE PErROLEUM INDUSTRY 304 (1954). Also, 2 cents per gallon
had been the established price differential between nationally branded gas and local brands
marketed in New Jersey. REPORT OF THE SENATE SMALL BUSINESS COMMITTEE ON
PEROLEUM MARKETING PRacrCES IN NEW JERSEY, S. REP. No. 2810, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.
18 (1956). As to the spread in grocery products, see note 120 supra.
178. Cf., e.g., the branded products marketed by the respondents in the Hansen Inocu-
lator, Edelmann, and Fruitvale Canning decisions.
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ners, even a minor disparity in measurement would disprove "fungibility.' u 9
Contrariwise, identical shirts differing only in collar size are "fungible" since
normally collar size is unlikely to influence haberdashers' decisions. In any
event, "fungibility" can furnish no panacea, only a guide to intelligent approxi-
mation. No test can supplant discerning judgment from case to case.
The proposed "fungibility" test comports with the text of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act. The law is prefaced by the dual condition that the goods in question
be of "like grade and quality." That two distinct conceptions were contemplated
is confirmed by the original Clayton Act's exemption of prices reflecting dif-
ferences in "grade" or "quality."' 80 The Federal Trade Commission in 1937
accorded the concept of "grade" separate meaningful content.'8 1 Considera-
tions of "quality" aside, the requirement of "like grade" whose import was
never clarified appears sufficiently plastic to take account of any other com-
mercially significant distinctions-whether physical or promotional differen-
tiations affecting market value. "Like grade" is thus readily equated with com-
mercial "fungibility." So construed, the condition of "like grade" would exempt
those non-"fungible" goods differentiated significantly in physical components
or promotional appeal. Such an interpretation, moreover, would heed the Su-
preme Court's admonition to avert "a price uniformity and rigidity in open
conflict with the purposes of other antitrust legislation" by construing Robin-
son-Patman's "infelicitous language" in consonance with "the broader antitrust
policies laid down by Congress."'
81 2
A "fungibility" test of "like grade and quality" would neither flout recorded
indicia of legislative intent nor emasculate the statute. During the hearings and
debates preceding Robinson-Patman enactment, the overriding purpose was to
squelch spurious packaging variations or bogus brands as easy devices for dodg-
ing the act.'8 3 This consideration, however, inheres in the operation of the
"fungibility" principle itself. Analogous products are deemed "fungible" unless
the differentiation at issue is translatable into tangible consumer appeal ex-
pressed in the marketplace. Consequently, faked variations in brand or
design without promotional value could not negate "fungibility" to serve as
successful subterfuge. It is true, on the other hand, that a negative ruling on
"like grade and quality" would automatically oust the applicability of the act,
and thereby exempt (from Robinson-Patman, not other antitrust bans) a seller's
price differentials among analogous products even in amounts disproportionate
to the value of an authentic differentiation. But genuine discriminations can
be, and have been, prosecuted under the Sherman Act and the general pro-
179. Contrast the Bruce's Juices decision.
ISO. Section 2 of the original Clayton Act exempted all differentials made "on account
of differences in the grade, quality, or quantity" of the product in question. "Grade" and
"quality" were deemed disjunctive by the FTC in the Goodyear case. See text at p. 6 supra.
11. See text at p. 9 supra.
182. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 63, 74, 78 (1953).
183. See text at pp. 8-9 supra.
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hibitions on "unfair methods of competition" in the Federal Trade Commission
Act. 84 Moreover, Robinson-Patman inability to reach truly discriminatory
prices is no novel inroad, but only one further limitation of the type already
confining its scope. For the Robinson-Patman Act is impotent to control even
grossly discriminatory pricing by a diversified seller among the different prod-
ucts in his line ;185 or to interdict nominally uniform but economically discrimi-
natory pricing among a seller's "like" products. 8 6
In short, any instances of genuinely discriminatory pricing that escaped
Robinson-Patman thanks to a stricter test of "like grade and quality" would
not thereby gain antitrust immunity. Enforcement would simply be shifted into
another antitrust domain. Any attendant readjustments of administrative
technique appear vastly overbalanced by the liberation of product differentiation
programs from the jeopardy of current Robinson-Patman interpretations.
CONCLUSION
Unless rescued by a reorientation of prevailing doctrine, the modern trend
of product differentiation is fated to collide with the Robinson-Patman Act-
whether at the hands of the Federal Trade Commission or treble damage claim-
ants. 8 7 Since innovistic product differentiation enriches the economy and
184. Discriminatory practices, whether exploitative or predatory, may be actionable
under the Sherman Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act. Sherman Act: e.g.,
United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 160 (1948) ; Story Parchment Co. v.
Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931) ; United States v. New York Great
A&P Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79, 88 (7th Cir. 1949). FTC Act: e.g., FTC v. Cement Institute,
333 U.S. 683, 721 n.19 (1948) ; E. B. Muller Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944).
185. A seller might commit genuinely discriminatory practices in pricing a diversified
line of distinct products, dropping his prices on those facing competition while maintain-
ing high prices on the others. Cf. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F.
Supp. 295, 349 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). See also Machlup,
Characteristics and Types of Price Discrimination, in BuslnESS CONCENTRATION AND
PRICE POLICY 397, 398-99 (1955) ; Ar'y GE . REP. 335-36 (1955). The Robinson-Patman
Act is of course powerless to reach price differentials quoted in the sale of entirely different
products.
186. Uniform price quotations irrespective of circumstances rendering them "discrimi-
natory" in the economic sense have long been held exempt from the Robinson-Patman Act.
E.g., Bird & Son, Inc., 25 F.T.C. 548 (1937); 81 CONG. R c. App. 2339-40 (1937).
187. Complaints could take any among a multitude of conceivable forms: The Com-
mission might charge that a seller's price differential for differentiated products "injured"
competition among the customers paying the higher and lower prices, or even among the
seller's competitors who for some reason felt pinched by his differential pricing policy.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 22 F.T.C. 232, 238-39 (1936) ; United States Rubber Co.,
46 F.T.C. 998, 1000-04 (1950). Also, the Commission may challenge accompanying pro-
motional campaigns for lack of availability to rival customers on "proportionally equal"
terms, Atalanta Trading Corp., FTC Dkt. 6464 (May 21, 1956), or may question a failure
to market the differentiated product itself through all competing distributors, General
Foods Corp., FTC Dkt. 6018 (Feb. 15, 1956). Private damage claims could be filed by
customers paying a higher price, Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp.
985 (S.D. Fla. 1949), or by competing sellers who complain of the effects of the differen-
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catalyzes competition in many markets, legal bars on its development frustrate
major objectives of national economic policy. The test of "fungibility" proposed
for administering the statutory condition of "like grade and quality" would not
only temper the law with the realities of business. It would also implement the
Supreme Court's directive to "reconcile" the Robinson-Patman Act with "the
broader antitrust policies laid down by Congress."
Thereby a legal legacy of the Great Depression could be modernized to fit
the economic scenery of a brighter era.
tial pricing on their own market fortunes, Midland Oil Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 41 F.
Supp. 436 (N.D. Ill. 1941). In the same way, customers who do not receive "proportionally
equal" promotional treatment may sue, Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150
F.2d 98S (Sth Cir. 1945), and even rival sellers prejudiced by their competitor's promo-
tional policy can bring action, American Cooperative Serum Ass'n v. Anchor Serum Co.,
153 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1946).
